Standing

Weekly Roundup for the week of February 2nd, 2026

U.S. Supreme Court

Community caretaking – An officer need not have “probable cause” or “reasonable suspicion” to believe an occupant is in need of emergency aid to enter a home without a warrant to render assistance.  Those standards are related to criminal investigations.  An officer need only have an “objectively reasonable basis” to believe that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such an injury to justify a warrantless intrusion.  Case v. Montana, No. 24-624 (January 14, 2026).

(Editor’s note: Essentially, this opinion rejects the defendant’s attempt to narrow the Court’s decision in Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006) and reaffirms that decision.)

Division I

Eyewitness identification – A trial court abuses its discretion by suppressing an identification procedure as inherently suggestive without considering if the procedure was necessary due to exigent circumstances, such as a single-photo showup identification when the suspect may still be in the area.  State v. Yellowcalf, No. 86685-1-I (Jan. 2, 2026).

Personal jurisdiction – A court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, in civil cases, requires compliance with both the state long-arm statute (RCW 4.28.185) and the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause. Due process requires: (1) purposeful minimum contacts must exist between the defendant and the forum state, (2) the plaintiff’s injuries must arise out of or relate to those minimum contacts, and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable, that is, consistent with notions of fair play and substantial justice.  King County v. Aquatherm, No. 85572-7-I (consolidated with No. 85595-6-I) (Feb. 2, 2026, unpublished).

(Editor’s note: Motion to publish granted on March 23, 2026.)

Foreign Cases of Interest

Standing – Where the plaintiff is an organization, they can establish standing by either 1) claiming the defendant injured the organization, or 2) claiming the defendant injured the organization’s members. Here, the alleged injuries to the organization were all caused by the plaintiffs’ own voluntary decisions to spend money on their cause, which does not count. And, alternative 2) was not satisfied because the juveniles were not members of the plaintiff organizations. The juveniles may not have even known the organizations existed and had no control over the organization’s decisions. Nor was there a special relationship between the organization and the juveniles combined with any inability of the juveniles to sue the defendants themselves.  Justice 360 v. South Carolina Dept. of Juvenile Justice, No. 25-1032 (4th Cir., Jan. 29, 2026).

(Editor’s note: the court recognized the Federal Circuits have disagreed on these issues, and the 9th and 11th Circuits have found organizations had standing in similar cases.)

Second amendment – Criminalizing deserializing firearms is consistent with the nations’ historical tradition of firearm regulation.  Although firearms were not serialized when the Second Amendment was ratified, founding-era regulations established various measures to inventory and track firearms.  The Bruen standard should not be misunderstood to mean that modern firearm regulations require close founding-era comparators.  United States v. Reyna, No. 23-1231 (7th Cir. Jan. 28, 2026).

WEEKLY ROUNDUP FOR THE WEEK OF October 13th

Division I:

Jury unanimity – No unanimity instruction is required if the charge is based on acts that are part of a single continuous course of conduct that happened over a short period of time.  Here, the defendant 1) held his arm out the car window with the gun, 2) chased down the victim in his car, and 3) blocked the victim with his vehicle and pointed the gun at the victim, all within a few minutes.  Thus, the harassment charge was based on a single course of conduct, and no unanimity instruction was required.  State v. Glover, No. 86605-2-I (Oct. 13, 2025, unpublished).

Division II:

Standing – Under the “subsequent purchaser doctrine” a plaintiff lacks standing to sue the government for inverse condemnation if the alleged government conduct happened before the plaintiff purchased the property (unless the seller expressly conveyed the right to sue for inverse condemnation to the buyer).  The court will assume the purchase price reflected any reduction in value caused by the government’s conduct and will not allow the plaintiff to recover the lost value again by suing the government for inverse condemnation.  Stephens v. Town of Steilacoom, No. 60051-0-II (Oct. 14, 2025 unpublished).

(Editor’s note: an “inverse condemnation” claim is a claim to recover the value of property that has been lost due to the government damaging or appropriating the property without formally exercising the power of eminent domain.  The plaintiff’s tort claims were “subsumed” into the inverse condemnation claim and dismissed along with it.)

Foreign case of interest:

Relevance – In a prosecution of a man for hate crimes against Black and Hispanic people, it was not an abuse of discretion to 1) exclude the defendant’s mental health evidence, which contained little information about the defendant’s mental health at the time of the offenses, and 2) to admit the Nazi paraphernalia found in the defendant’s home to rebut the defendant’s testimony that the only reason he possessed an (already admitted) Confederate flag was because he “supports the military” and was interested in the history of the Civil War. United States v. Hudak, No. 24-4313 (4th Cir., October 7, 2025).

WEEKLY ROUNDUP FOR THE WEEK OF JULY 21, 2025

Division I:

SSOSA – Invited error doctrine precludes an offender who was granted a SSOSA from appealing the conditions of sentence that were recommended by the offender’s evaluation and that were argued by the offender (and relied upon by the court) as reasons to grant the SSOSA.  State v. Smith, No. 86394-1-I (July 21, 2025).

Division II:

Standing – Counties have standing to argue the funding system for indigent defense violates defendants’ right to counsel and equal protection.  Counties are within the “zone of interest” of the funding system that they are challenging because the funding system is intended to help counties meet their constitutional requirement to provide indigent defense services.  The “injury in fact” requirement is met because the counties allege the current funding system directly harms the counties’ ability to meet their constitutional duty to provide indigent defense.  But even if the zone of interest or injury in fact requirements was a close call, the court would still find standing because of the public importance of the issue.  Washington State Assoc. of Counties v. State, No. 60179-6-II (July 22, 2025).

Division III:

Vacation – Two violations of violating the same domestic violence no-contact Order, separated by five months, are not a “single incident” as defined in the vacation statute, RCW 9.96.060(f)(ii), and cannot be vacated.  State v. Marvin, No. 40113-8-III (July 23, 2025).

9th Circuit:

Evidence – Visual identification lies within the province of the factfinder, who may properly compare photographic or video evidence of the culprit’s identity with the defendant’s courtroom appearance.  The defendant’s courtroom appearance is not extrinsic evidence, regardless of whether it is somehow formally introduced into the record.  United States v. Hassan, No 24-263 (9th Cir., July 22, 2025).

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