Second amendment
Division III
Employment Law – A trial court errs in ordering arbitration of a disciplinary action when the collective bargaining agreement clearly excludes disciplinary actions from the grievance process and from arbitration and instead provides that disciplinary actions are subject to the civil service rules and regulations. Teamsters Local 839 v. Benton County, No. 40861-2-III (Jul. 7, 2026)
United States Supreme Court
Search and Seizure – In this case involving geofence warrants the Court held that police officers conduct a “search” under the Fourth Amendment when they acquire an individual’s location data from Google because an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell-phone location information. Chatrie v. United States, No. 25-112 (Jun. 29, 2026)
Division II
Attorney Discipline – The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Ch. 34.05 RCW, does not apply to the Washington State Bar Association (WSBA). Here, the WSBA denied an attorney’s request for a jury trial on whether she violated the ethics rules. The attorney then filed a petition for judicial review of the denial, under the APA, in Superior Court. The Superior Court correctly dismissed the petition because the APA does not apply to the WSBA and the Superior Court did not have authority to review the petition. The Washington Supreme Court has exclusive authority over lawyer discipline and can address whether disciplinary proceedings must be tried before a jury. The WSBA does not impose discipline. The WSBA makes disciplinary recommendations to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court imposes discipline. Shogren v. Washington State Bar Association, No. 60736-1-II (Jun. 30, 2026)
United States Supreme Court
Second Amendment – The federal Gun Control Act violates the Second Amendment to the extent that it prohibits “any unlawful user” of “any controlled substance” from possessing a firearm. 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(3). The Court chose not to address the constitutionality of laws that prohibit addicts, or those presently intoxicated, from possessing a firearm; laws that the legislature adopts after determining that users of a particular drug pose a special risk of misusing firearms; laws disarming individuals convicted of felonies (often drug-related ones). Nor did the court address whether the government could bring a prosecution under §922(g)(3) accompanied by individualized proof of the defendant’s dangerousness when using the controlled substance. These questions were not before the court. United State v. Hemani, No. 24-1234 (Jun. 18, 2026)
Plea Agreements – An agreement not to appeal a sentence is unenforceable when it would result in a miscarriage of justice – meaning, when it would leave in place the kind of egregious error that would bring the judicial system into disrepute. Hunter v. United State, No. 24-1063 (Jun. 18, 2026)
Division II
Prosecutorial Misconduct – A prosecutor does not commit misconduct by asking potential jurors “Does anybody here feel like they would not be able to convict based on testimony alone?” The question does not improperly implicate the unique facts of the case, nor does it commit potential jurors to a verdict. Rather, it seeks to assess whether the potential jurors can follow RCW 9A.44.020(1). State v. Camacho, No. 59503-6-II (May 22, 2026, Motion to Publish Granted Jun 18, 2026)
Jury Unanimity – The invited error doctrine prevents a defendant from challenging, for the first time on appeal, the trial court’s failure to give a Petrich unanimity instruction where the defendant’s proposed jury instructions did not contain a unanimity instruction, and where the defendant declined the court’s proposal to give a related limiting instruction. State v. Camacho, No. 59503-6-II (May 22, 2026, Motion to Publish Granted Jun 18, 2026)
Division III
Attempted Rape of a Child in the Second Degree – In a prosecution for Attempted Rape of a Child in the Second Degree, the defendant’s subjective belief about the intended victim’s age is relevant and material to prove his intent, but it is not a separate element that the State must prove. State v. Erlandson, No. 40207-0-III (Jun. 16, 2026, Published in part)
Washington Supreme Court
Second Amendment – Under the Second Amendment, the temporary firearm prohibition for recidivist drunk drivers in RCW 9.41.040(2)(a)(i)(D) is constitutional without an individualized assessment of the defendant’s dangerousness. The statute is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of disarming groups of people presenting a special danger of misuse. Holloway v. Brown, No. 103799-6 (Jun. 11, 2026)
Jury Instructions – Potentially misleading jury instructions are not reversible error unless they are prejudicial. Prejudice is presumed if the jury instruction clearly misstates the law but not if the instruction is only potentially misleading. Verduzco v. King County, No. 103749-0 (Jun. 11, 2026)
Division II
Sexual Exploitation of a Minor – Exposing one’s breast while another person watches is an “exhibition” and therefore is a “live performance” that constitutes sexual exploitation of a minor under RCW 9.68A.040(1)(b). “Live performance” means “any play, show, skit, dance, or other exhibition performed … to … an audience of one or more, with or without consideration.” RCW 9.68A.011(4). Here, the defendant caused a minor to expose her breast to him on several occasions. The court applied ejusdem generis and held that this activity was “similar enough in nature” to the specifically listed activities “any play, show, skit, dance …” to fall within the general catch-all phrase “or other exhibition” in RCW 9.68A.011(4). The definitions in RCW 9.68A.011 should be “used with a measure of flexibility.” State v. Moss, No. 60520-1-II (Jun. 9, 2026, published in part)
Judicial Impartiality – A trial court violates its duty to be impartial and abuses its discretion by repeatedly advocating for one side. Here, the trial court advocated for the defendant by interrogating the investigating officer outside the presence of the jury, and steering defense counsel into a discussion about whether the officer gave pretextual reasons for the vehicle stop. The jury found the defendant guilty of Assault in the 3rd Degree for punching the officer in the nose. However, the trial court then dismissed the case for government misconduct under CrR 8.3(b). The trial court based the dismissal on its finding that the officer “lied” about why he stopped the vehicle, and that the State failed to correct the lie in front of the jury. Substantial evidence did not support the trial court’s finding that the officer lied. The trial court violated the state’s right to a fair trial. The court of appeals reversed the dismissal, reinstated the jury’s verdict, and remanded the case for sentencing. State v. Rutledge, No. 59684-9-II (Jun. 9, 2026, Unpublished)
Washington Supreme Court
Land use petition act (LUPA) – A LUPA petitioner must strictly comply with both RCW 4.28.080 and RCW 36.70C.040 when serving a LUPA petition on a local government. Here, the petitioner’s first attempted service was timely because it was within LUPA’s 21-day SOL. RCW 36.70C.040(3). But it was improper because it was made on a front desk employee at City Hall who was not designated to receive service. RCW 4.28.080(2). The second attempted service was made on the City Manager, who was designated to receive it. But it was untimely because it was 24-days after the City emailed its decision canceling the petitioner’s land use application. The three-day extension of the 21-day SOL only applies when the city mails a written land use decision, not when it emails it. Chandrruangphen v. City of Sammamish, No. 103789-9 (Feb. 12, 2026).
(Editor’s note: Whether cancellation of a land use application is a final land use decision, or merely interlocutory, and thus not appealable under LUPA, was not before the court. The amendment to LUPA in 2024 allowing service on “the office of a person” did not apply because the attempted service happened in 2023. RCW 36.70C.040(5).)
Division I
Second amendment – A protection order requiring an individual to surrender firearms does not violate the Second Amendment when the court finds the individual poses a clear threat of physical violence to another. The threat does not have to be towards a specific identified person. Procedural Due Process only requires notice and an opportunity to be heard. Here, the defendant had an opportunity to be heard but he chose not to appear for the hearing. Thus, there was no Due Process violation. State v. Bell, No. 84534-9-I (consolidated with No. 87502-7-I) (Feb. 9, 2026).
Division III
Confrontation clause – The confrontation clause requires a criminal defendant be allowed to cross-examine any forensic scientist whose work the final, opining scientist relies, regardless of whether they prepared a report or formed any conclusions or opinions. State v. Dodson, No. 39755-6-III (February 10, 2026).
(Editor’s note: This case largely repeats the holdings of Smith v. Arizona and State v. Hall-Haught. It appears to be published largely to voice dissatisfaction with the harmless error standard.)
Foreign Case of Interest
Second amendment – Prohibiting the concealed carrying of switchblade knives in public is a restriction supported by our Nation’s history and tradition of arms regulations. Knife Rights, Inc. v. Bonta, No. 24-5536 (9th Cir. January 30, 2026).
U.S. Supreme Court
Community caretaking – An officer need not have “probable cause” or “reasonable suspicion” to believe an occupant is in need of emergency aid to enter a home without a warrant to render assistance. Those standards are related to criminal investigations. An officer need only have an “objectively reasonable basis” to believe that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such an injury to justify a warrantless intrusion. Case v. Montana, No. 24-624 (January 14, 2026).
(Editor’s note: Essentially, this opinion rejects the defendant’s attempt to narrow the Court’s decision in Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006) and reaffirms that decision.)
Division I
Eyewitness identification – A trial court abuses its discretion by suppressing an identification procedure as inherently suggestive without considering if the procedure was necessary due to exigent circumstances, such as a single-photo showup identification when the suspect may still be in the area. State v. Yellowcalf, No. 86685-1-I (Jan. 2, 2026).
Personal jurisdiction – A court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, in civil cases, requires compliance with both the state long-arm statute (RCW 4.28.185) and the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause. Due process requires: (1) purposeful minimum contacts must exist between the defendant and the forum state, (2) the plaintiff’s injuries must arise out of or relate to those minimum contacts, and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable, that is, consistent with notions of fair play and substantial justice. King County v. Aquatherm, No. 85572-7-I (consolidated with No. 85595-6-I) (Feb. 2, 2026, unpublished).
(Editor’s note: Motion to publish granted on March 23, 2026.)
Foreign Cases of Interest
Standing – Where the plaintiff is an organization, they can establish standing by either 1) claiming the defendant injured the organization, or 2) claiming the defendant injured the organization’s members. Here, the alleged injuries to the organization were all caused by the plaintiffs’ own voluntary decisions to spend money on their cause, which does not count. And, alternative 2) was not satisfied because the juveniles were not members of the plaintiff organizations. The juveniles may not have even known the organizations existed and had no control over the organization’s decisions. Nor was there a special relationship between the organization and the juveniles combined with any inability of the juveniles to sue the defendants themselves. Justice 360 v. South Carolina Dept. of Juvenile Justice, No. 25-1032 (4th Cir., Jan. 29, 2026).
(Editor’s note: the court recognized the Federal Circuits have disagreed on these issues, and the 9th and 11th Circuits have found organizations had standing in similar cases.)
Second amendment – Criminalizing deserializing firearms is consistent with the nations’ historical tradition of firearm regulation. Although firearms were not serialized when the Second Amendment was ratified, founding-era regulations established various measures to inventory and track firearms. The Bruen standard should not be misunderstood to mean that modern firearm regulations require close founding-era comparators. United States v. Reyna, No. 23-1231 (7th Cir. Jan. 28, 2026).
Washington Supreme Court
Elections – A county auditor, after receiving a valid petition to amend a first-class city’s charter, must put the amendment on the ballot and submit it to the voters “at the next regular municipal election, occurring thirty days or more after said petition is filed.” RCW 35.22.120. The phrase “next regular municipal election” means the next municipal election, whether that is a general or a special election. A Better Richland v. Chilton, No. 103715-5 (Jan. 29, 2026).
9th Circuit
Second amendment – Criminalizing the possession of firearms by noncitizens unlawfully present in the United States is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation and does not run afoul of the Second Amendment. United States v. Vazquez-Ramirez, No. 24-3544 (Jan. 2, 2026).
(Editor’s note: The case analyzes the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A), but the same logic would presumably apply to RCW 9.41.171, Alien possession of firearms.)
Washington Supreme Court:
Victim’s rights – Where a trial court has allowed a nonparty, such as a victim or a victim’s survivor, to intervene to protect a legally cognizable interest, such as privacy, an appellate court may allow that nonparty to intervene on appeal, but solely on the issues the nonparty addressed in the trial court. State v. Thompson, No. 103338-9 (August 28, 2025).
Division I:
Juvenile confinement – At Green Hill School, juveniles were confined to their cells for lengthy periods due to staff shortages and overcrowding and had to urinate into plastic containers when bathroom wait times were too long. These conditions did not deprive the juveniles of human dignity, and were not severely unhygienic, and therefore not unconstitutionally cruel. Because the violations were statutory, as the State conceded, the proper remedy was to require the facility to comply with the statutes at once, but not to release the juveniles. In Re PRP of M.T.M.L., No. 86707-5-I (Aug. 25, 2025).
(Editor’s note: While this case was pending, one of the juveniles was transferred to a group home and subsequently escaped and, according to the opinion, is still at large.)
Foreign cases of interest:
Traffic stops – Roadside questioning generally falls into four categories: 1) small talk; 2) infraction-related inquires; 3) officer- and roadway safety-related inquires (which may include brief, casual questioning aimed at gauging risks or deescalating a situation); and 4) off-mission inquires. Benign small talk has no constitutional significance. Infraction-related inquires are obviously permitted. Questions that initially appear unrelated to officer safety may qualify as on-mission, safety-related inquiries when: 1) the officer has an articulable basis for safety concerns grounded in observable facts; 2) the questions, taken in context, can be reasonably understood as relating to those safety concerns, such as an effort to defuse tension, assess demeanor, determine the degree of caution needed, or evaluate whether the driver presents a threat; and 3) the officer does not prolong the stop with unrelated follow-up inquiries once reassured. Off-mission inquires that extend the time of a traffic stop must be supported by reasonable suspicion that there is an additional crime besides the reason for the initial stop to pass constitutional muster. Here, a 5-second exchange where an officer complemented the driver’s watch and asked him what he did for a living was constitutionally permissible because the driver exhibited signs of anxiety and nervousness, and such small talk could lower the “temperature” of the stop, and was not intrusive, in-depth, or asked repeatedly, and the officer asked no follow-up questions. United States v. Ross, No 23-1631 (3rd Cir., August 19, 2025).
Second amendment – Blanket waiting periods for firearm sales infringe on the Second Amendment by preventing the lawful acquisition of firearms and are not consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of regulating firearms. Ortega, et al. v. Lujan Grisham, et al., No. 24-2121 (10th Cir., August 19, 2025).
Washington Supreme Court:
Blake – Consequences of the Blake decision are not self-executing. An arrest warrant issued for an offender pursuant to a void conviction is voidable, but was not automatically void upon publication of the Blake decision. State v. Balles, No. 103582-9 (July 31, 2025).
Pretrial conditions – No authority of law authorizes a judge to order the patting down, handcuffing, and detaining a criminal defendant for the purposes of complying with RCW 10.98.050 (administrative booking.) State v. Evans, No. 103136-0 (July 31, 2025).
Standard of review – The standard of review of the sufficiency of the evidence in a bench trial is the same as a jury trial: whether, after viewing all of the evidence, presented in a light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. A trial court’s written findings and conclusions do not limit appellate review. State v. Roberts, No. 103546-2 (July 31, 2025).
Offender scoring – A point is properly added to the offender score of a defendant who commits a felony while being supervised by Washington DOC under the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision, regardless of whether the underlying foreign crime is comparable to a Washington offense. State v. Roberts, No. 103546-2 (July 31, 2025).
Recall – A recall petition will be dismissed if the next general election in which the elected official is up for reelection is less than six months away because the recall sponsors cannot meet the time limit in RCW 29A.56.150(1), and a court can no longer provide effective relief. In the Matter of Recall of Ruelas, No. 103542-0 (Jul. 31, 2025).
Division I:
Community custody conditions – A condition of community custody that the offender “remain within geographic boundaries, as set forth in writing by the CCO” is not unconstitutionally vague. RCW 9.94A.704 limits DOC’s authority to those reasonably related to… “[t]he crime of conviction, the offender’s risk of reoffending, or the safety of the community.” State v. Lundstrom, No. 86537-4-I (July 28, 2025).
Sexual assault protection orders – Courts do not need to determine whether the respondent in a SAPO petition has criminal capacity or is old enough to form the criminal intent necessary to commit the alleged crime. Conduct that would not support criminal liability can still be a basis for obtaining a sexual assault protection order. Jones v. Darragh, No. 86397-5-I (Jul. 28, 2025).
Division II:
Conspiracy – A defendant who gave his sister a gun and persuaded her to shoot him at work so he could file an L&I claim can be held criminally liable for Conspiracy to Commit Assault 2 and Conspiracy to Commit Drive-By Shooting. Although the legislature expressly prohibits victims being liable under an Accessory theory, the same is not true for Conspiracy. State v. Floe, No. 59948-1-II (July 29, 2025)
Blake – Due process does not require the State to refund the $370 that defendant paid toward the $500 drug court participation fee because the fee was not from a conviction, but from a contract entered when simple drug possession was a crime. The Eighth Amendment’s excessive fines clause does not apply because the fee was not punitive and therefore was not a fine. The contract doctrine of “frustration” does not require a refund because the $370 was for the State’s partial performance that occurred before Blake frustrated the contract. “Unjust enrichment” does not require a refund because that theory does not apply when there is a contract. “Mutual mistake” does not apply because Blake did not nullify the contract or render defendant’s agreement unknowing or involuntary. Former RCW 10.01.160(3) and Blazina do not apply because the trial court did not sentence the defendant. Extortion does not apply because the State did not unlawfully threaten the defendant into entering the contract. State v. Ward, No. 58969-9-II (July 29, 2025, unpublished)
Foreign cases of interest:
Nondisclosure orders – The Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2705, requires that a court issuing a search warrant or subpoena make a determination for each warrant or subpoena that disclosure to the user would harm the government’s case. A court cannot issue a blanket nondisclosure Order that applies to all future warrants or subpoenas in an investigation. In Re: Sealed Case, No. 24-5089 (D.C. Cir., July 18, 2025).
Sex offenders – States may require convicted sex offenders to participate in a sex-offender program as a condition of parole without providing any more process than a criminal trial (or a plea) on the underlying offense. McClendon El v. Washington, et al., No. 24-1849 (6th Cir., July 21, 2025).
Second Amendment – A federal statute (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4)) prohibiting firearm possession by a person previously involuntarily committed to a mental institution, but now released, is not facially unconstitutional because situations exist where the statute may be applied consistent with the Second Amendment. Release from a mental institution (in West Virginia) is not equivalent to a judicial determination that the person is no longer dangerous. United States v. Gould, No. 24-4192 (4th Cir. July 29, 2025).