Restitution

Weekly Roundup for the week of August 3, 2026

Division III

Restitution – Restitution may not exceed twice the victim’s loss, even if the precise amount of the loss cannot be easily proven. RCW 9.94A.753(3)(a).  Here, the State failed to establish the amount of the hospital’s loss because it did not believe there was any reliable method for determining the value of the medical lamp that the defendant damaged.  Nevertheless, the trial court ordered restitution of $14,563.49, the amount the hospital paid to purchase a replacement lamp.  The appellate court remanded for a new restitution hearing to ensure that the award did not exceed twice the hospital’s actual loss.  The court explained that the State could establish an approximate loss amount by presenting evidence of the lamp’s original purchase price and purchase date, estimating its remaining useful life at the time it was damaged, and calculating the value of the lost useful life on a pro rata basis.  State v. Charles, No. 40514-1-III (Aug. 6, 2026, Published in Part)

Weekly Roundup for the week of January 19th, 2026

U.S. Supreme Court:

Restitution – Restitution under the Mandatory Crime Victim’s Restitution Act of 1996 is criminal punishment for purposes of the ex post facto clause and cannot be imposed on defendants who committed their crimes before passage of the Act.  Ellingburg v. United States, No. 24-482 (January 20, 2026).

(Editor’s note:  This case deals with restitution under a federal provision of law and is not binding on cases where restitution is ordered pursuant to state law.  The case is included to defend against frivolous arguments that the U.S. Supreme Court has held that all restitution is punitive.  The case only holds that it is punitive for the purposes of an ex post facto analysis.  Washington courts have held that restitution under the SRA is both compensatory and punitive, and restitution under the SRA cannot be imposed for crimes committed prior to the effective date of the Act.)

Division I:

Right to silence –  An individual may invoke the right to silence before they are in custody or the subject of suspicion or investigation because the right originates from the Fifth Amendment, not Miranda (citing State v. Easter, 130 Wn.2d 228, 243 (1996)).  Here, the defendant invoked the right when her attorney informed police, before she was in custody or under arrest, not to contact the defendant.  The state violated the right by eliciting testimony, during its case in chief, that the defendant failed to reach out to investigators, call, check in, or provide information about the case.  The case Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. 178 (2013) did not overrule Easter because the court in Salinas did not decide whether defendants can assert the right to silence pre-custody and pre-arrest.  Instead, the court in Salinas held the defendant did not invoke his right to silence.  State v. Ianniciello, No. 86711-3-I (Jan. 20, 2026, substitute published opinion)

WEEKLY ROUNDUP for Weeks of December 22 and 29

Division I:

Evidence – A rational trier of fact could find a defendant intended to deliver controlled substances based on evidence that the defendant 1) was homeless but possessed 10 grams of meth and 50 fentanyl pills in separate receptacles with a street value of up to $800, 2) possessed $200 in denominations of a $100 bill and five $20 bills, 3) another person had been sitting in the defendant’s truck with him, near where a second pipe used for ingesting drugs was found, 4) deputy testimony that the size of the baggie was larger than normal for personal use, and that the other circumstances above indicated intent to deliver.  State v. Hoover, No. 87203-6-I (Dec. 22, 2025, published in part).

Restitution – Before waiving restitution to an insurance company under RCW 9.94A.753(3), a trial court must find both that the defendant does not have a current ability to pay and that the defendant will likely not have a future ability to pay.  Here, because the defendant had no physical or mental debilitation that would prevent work in the future, the court did not err in ordering restitution to the insurance company.  State v. Morgan, No. 86639-7-I (Dec. 29, 2025, Published in part).

Division II:

Evidence – The second-degree burglary statute does not require a “nexus” between the unlawful entry and the crime the defendant intends to commit in the building.  Here, the defendant committed second degree burglary by 1) unlawfully entering Winco Foods in violation of a trespass order, and 2) with the intent to commit the crime of violating a Domestic Violence No Contact Order (the defendant entered the store together with the protected person).  State v. Veith, No. 59783-7-II (Dec. 23, 2025, unpublished).

9th Circuit:

Social media posts – When a social media company provides an authentication of social media posts, they authenticate the technical attributes of the records, not the substance of the posts.  The substance of the posts is authenticated via ER 901.  United States v. Allen, No. 24-804 (November 17, 2025).

WEEKLY ROUNDUP FOR THE WEEK OF November 10th

Washington Supreme Court:

Youthful offenders – Failure to meaningfully consider the mitigating qualities of youth in sentencing when requested is an abuse of discretion.  A youthful defendant need not present any evidence to support a claim of youthfulness. Defendants need not object to preserve the error, nor need they allege ineffective assistance of counsel to appeal a failure to meaningfully consider the mitigating qualities of youth.   Although the court must consider youthfulness, the court retains the discretion to not grant a mitigated sentence.  State v. Ellis, No. 102378-2 (November 13, 2025).

Restitution – When restitution is solely compensatory, it is not “punishment” for the purposes of the excessive fines clause.  State v. Ellis, No. 102378-2 (November 13, 2025).

WEEKLY ROUNDUP FOR THE WEEK OF September 1

Washington Supreme Court:

Employment law – In 2022, the legislature amended RCW 49.58.110(1) to require employers with 15 or more employees to disclose salary, wage, and benefits information in all job postings.  Violations of this requirement entitles “job applicants” to $100 – $5,000 per violation plus attorneys’ fees.  RCW 49.58.110(5)(a).  “Job applicant” means a person who applies to a job posting, regardless of their subjective intent.  Plaintiffs need not show they are “bona fide” applicants, or that they applied in “good faith,” or that they were qualified for the job, or that they sincerely wanted the job, or that they weren’t simply applying so they could recover the statutory damages.  Branson v. Washington Fine Wine & Spirits, LLC, No. 103394-0 (Sep. 4, 2025).

Division I:

Indeterminate Sentence Review Board – The ISRB abused its discretion when it denied the petitioner’s request for release without meaningfully considering whether appropriate release conditions could lower the petitioner’s risk of reoffending to an acceptable level.  The ISRB listed possible release conditions, and said they were insufficient, but did not say why they were insufficient, other than relying on the doctor’s conclusion that the petitioner was a Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) and was likely to reoffend regardless of release conditions.  The ISRB, the court explained, should not have relied so heavily on the doctor’s evaluation because the evaluation was five years old and the petitioner was entitled to be reevaluated yearly under 71.09 RCW.  Additionally, the petitioner disputed that he was a SVP, thus he was entitled to a determination by a fact finder, not just by the doctor.  In Re the Personal Restrain of Day, No. 87505-3-I (Sept. 2, 2025).

Restitution – An appellate court’s decision to reverse and remand a restitution order for a hearing on the causal connection between the conviction, and the restitution amount ordered, is not necessarily a “modification” of the trial court’s restitution order.  Therefore, RAP 12.8 (which authorizes refunds for overpaid restitution in appropriate circumstances) did not apply.  And even if it did, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s request for reimbursement of restitution.  Nelson v. Colorado, 581 U.S. 128, 139 (2017) is inapplicable because the underlying conviction was not overturned.  There was no due process violation because the defendant may still bring a civil action against the parties who ultimately received the money he paid and may receive a refund from them if appropriate.  State v. Butcher, No. 86575-7-I (Sep. 2, 2025, unpublished).

Hearsay – A detective’s testimony that the defendant’s friend used a racial slur to describe the victim during the friend’s interview with the detective after the defendant killed the victim was not hearsay because the statement was not used to prove the truth of the matter asserted.  Rather, the statement was used to prove the friend’s state of mind.  However, the statement should have been excluded if the friend’s state of mind was irrelevant.  The court did not decide whether the trial court erred by admitting the statement because any error was harmless.  State v. Hoffman, No. 85456-9-I Sept. 2, 2025, unpublished).

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