Mental health sentencing alternative

Washington Supreme Court:

Confessions – The Juvenile Access to an Attorney Statute, RCW 13.40.740, is not retroactive because the legislature did not say it is retroactive, and because the statute creates a new substantive right rather than remedying a preexisting right.  Here, the statute did not apply because the police sought waiver of the juvenile’s right to remain silent before the statute took effect.  However, admitting the juvenile’s statements violated the defendant’s right against self-incrimination because the totality of the circumstances indicated the defendant lacked full awareness of the nature of the rights she was waiving, and the consequences of waiving them.  The circumstances included the defendant’s youth (16 years old), she had never been Mirandized before, she recently sustained dozens of blows to the head, she felt dizzy, light-headed, after the interview she said she did not fully understand the warnings, or how to request an attorney, and that she thought she had to do what the detective said.  The court also relied on research studies from amici about juveniles.  State v. Luna, No. 103251-0 (Oct. 30, 2025).

Evidence – The trial court violated the defendant’s right to present a defense when it excluded an image the defendant received from an unknown third party on Snapchat with text claiming to put a “green light” (or hit) on the defendant and stating the victim had a whole gang ready to take the defendant out.  The evidence was not hearsay because it was not offered to show the truth of the matter asserted, but to show the defendant’s fear before the altercation.  Evidence of defendant’s fear was relevant to self-defense.  State v. Luna, No. 103251-0 (Oct. 30, 2025).

Division II:

Mental health sentencing alternative –  The Mental Health Sentencing Alternative (MHSA) statute requires the court to waive the standard range sentence when granting an MHSA.  RCW 9.94A.695(4).  All deadly weapon enhancements are mandatory and must be served in total confinement notwithstanding any other provision of law.  RCW 9.94A.5334)(e).  It is ambiguous whether the legislature intended a deadly weapon enhancement to become part of the standard range, and to be waived when the court grants an MHSA.  Thus, the rule of lenity applies, the standard range subsumes the deadly weapons enhancement, and the court properly ordered zero confinement when it granted the MHSA.  State v. Perrin, No. 58786-6-II (Oct. 28, 2025).

Same criminal conduct – If two crimes have different objective statutory intents, then they are not the “same criminal conduct” for purposes of the offender score.  No additional analysis is necessary on whether the crimes furthered each other, were part of the same plan, occurred at the same time or place, or had the same victim.  State v. Perrin, No. 58786-6-II (Oct. 28, 2025).

Boundary Line Adjustments (BLA) – The county did not erroneously interpret the law and its code when it determined that a BLA must comply with the applicable zoning density and when it then denied the petitioners’ applications for BLA’s.  Cape George Land Company v. Jefferson County, No. 59366-1-II (Oct. 28, 2025, unpublished).