Manifest error
Washington Supreme Court:
Confrontation clause – Only statements that are both testimonial and hearsay implicate the confrontation clause. The confrontation clause does not prohibit a trial court from admitting out of court statements that are not hearsay even if the defendant never had an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Here, the statements were not hearsay because they were not used to show the truth of the matter asserted. Rather, the statements were used to show why the officers focused their investigation on the defendant. Thus, the court did not violate the confrontation clause by admitting the statements. State v. Bennett, No. 103469-5 (Jan. 15, 2026)
Rule of completeness – Under the rule of completeness, when a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the party to introduce any other writing or recorded statement, which “ought in fairness” be considered with it. ER 106. The rule is based on fairness and the truth-seeking function of trials and applies narrowly to statements offered to correct the misleading statement. The court need not consider alternative theories of admissibility such as “opening the door” “invited error” and “waiver” when the rule of completeness applies. Here, the court applied the rule to verbal statements indicating the rule is not limited to written or recorded statements. State v. Bennett, No. 103469-5 (Jan. 15, 2026)
Harmless error – Appellate courts must consider whether the alleged constitutional error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt by considering both 1) the corrosive impact of the improperly admitted evidence; and 2) the strength of the properly admitted evidence. State v. Magaña-Arévalo, No. 103586-1 (Jan. 15, 2026).
Miranda – An officer’s advisement that a person is free to leave and not under arrest is just one factor to consider in the totality of the circumstances when deciding if the person is “in custody” for Miranda purposes. However, it is not dispositive. An officer’s admonishment alone cannot erase the custodial nature of an encounter. State v. Magaña-Arévalo, No. 103586-1 (Jan. 15, 2026).
(Editor’s note: In another opinion, State v. Wasuge, No. 103530-6, also published today, the Washington Supreme Court applied the Magaña-Arévalo decisions to a dissimilar set of facts. However, Wasuge did not announce any new principal of law that was not already contained within in Magaña-Arévalo, so no separate summary has been prepared.)
Double jeopardy – Pistol-whipping a person and then shooting at them is the same course of conduct, so long as it took place in a short period of time in the same place and the defendant stayed mad at the victim the whole time for the same reason. State v. Lee, No. 103451-2 (Jan. 15, 2026).
Manifest error – A court’s explanation for an evidentiary ruling that could be interpreted either as a comment on the evidence or just the legal reason for the decision does not rise to the level of manifest constitutional error and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal under RAP 2.5(a)(3). State v. Lee, No. 103451-2 (Jan. 15, 2026).
Division I:
Weapons surrender – A court abuses its discretion by failing to impose a period of incarceration lasting until the respondent has complied with a weapons surrender order, and by terminating the weapons surrender proceedings, when other reasonable contempt sanctions have proven ineffective. Llana v. Holiwell, No. 86474-2-I (Jan. 8, 2026).
Division II:
Repeat voting – The repeat voting statute is ambiguous as to whether it only prohibits repeat voting on the same issues and candidates, or whether it more broadly prohibits voting in both WA and another state in any election that occurs on the same date, even if, as here, none of the issues and candidates on the two state’s ballots were the same. RCW 29A.84.650(1). Both interpretations are reasonable. Thus, the rule of lenity applies, and the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for repeat voting. State v. Padrta, 59737-3-II (Jan. 6, 2026).
(Editor’s note: this opinion was abrogated by SB 6084 on Mar. 17, 2026)
Division III:
Sentencing – A sentencing court has discretion to run firearm related sentences concurrently if running them consecutively results in a clearly excessive sentence that conflicts with the SRA’s core values of proportionality and consistency. RCW 9.94A.535(1)(g). A court abuses its discretion when it mistakenly believes it lacks discretion to impose an exceptional mitigated sentence, or when it imposes consecutive sentences that conflict with the SRA’s core values, notwithstanding RCW 9.94A.589(1)(c). The rule that standard range sentences cannot be appealed does not prevent defendants from appealing the legal determinations underlying the sentence. RCW 9.94A.585(1). A court can decline to consider a pro se motion when the party is represented by competent counsel, but if the court rules on it then the issue is preserved. State v. Smith, No. 40341-6-III (Jan. 8, 2026, Published in part).