Jury
Division III
Employment Law – A trial court errs in ordering arbitration of a disciplinary action when the collective bargaining agreement clearly excludes disciplinary actions from the grievance process and from arbitration and instead provides that disciplinary actions are subject to the civil service rules and regulations. Teamsters Local 839 v. Benton County, No. 40861-2-III (Jul. 7, 2026)
United States Supreme Court
Search and Seizure – In this case involving geofence warrants the Court held that police officers conduct a “search” under the Fourth Amendment when they acquire an individual’s location data from Google because an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell-phone location information. Chatrie v. United States, No. 25-112 (Jun. 29, 2026)
Division II
Attorney Discipline – The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Ch. 34.05 RCW, does not apply to the Washington State Bar Association (WSBA). Here, the WSBA denied an attorney’s request for a jury trial on whether she violated the ethics rules. The attorney then filed a petition for judicial review of the denial, under the APA, in Superior Court. The Superior Court correctly dismissed the petition because the APA does not apply to the WSBA and the Superior Court did not have authority to review the petition. The Washington Supreme Court has exclusive authority over lawyer discipline and can address whether disciplinary proceedings must be tried before a jury. The WSBA does not impose discipline. The WSBA makes disciplinary recommendations to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court imposes discipline. Shogren v. Washington State Bar Association, No. 60736-1-II (Jun. 30, 2026)
United States Supreme Court
Second Amendment – The federal Gun Control Act violates the Second Amendment to the extent that it prohibits “any unlawful user” of “any controlled substance” from possessing a firearm. 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(3). The Court chose not to address the constitutionality of laws that prohibit addicts, or those presently intoxicated, from possessing a firearm; laws that the legislature adopts after determining that users of a particular drug pose a special risk of misusing firearms; laws disarming individuals convicted of felonies (often drug-related ones). Nor did the court address whether the government could bring a prosecution under §922(g)(3) accompanied by individualized proof of the defendant’s dangerousness when using the controlled substance. These questions were not before the court. United State v. Hemani, No. 24-1234 (Jun. 18, 2026)
Plea Agreements – An agreement not to appeal a sentence is unenforceable when it would result in a miscarriage of justice – meaning, when it would leave in place the kind of egregious error that would bring the judicial system into disrepute. Hunter v. United State, No. 24-1063 (Jun. 18, 2026)
Division II
Prosecutorial Misconduct – A prosecutor does not commit misconduct by asking potential jurors “Does anybody here feel like they would not be able to convict based on testimony alone?” The question does not improperly implicate the unique facts of the case, nor does it commit potential jurors to a verdict. Rather, it seeks to assess whether the potential jurors can follow RCW 9A.44.020(1). State v. Camacho, No. 59503-6-II (May 22, 2026, Motion to Publish Granted Jun 18, 2026)
Jury Unanimity – The invited error doctrine prevents a defendant from challenging, for the first time on appeal, the trial court’s failure to give a Petrich unanimity instruction where the defendant’s proposed jury instructions did not contain a unanimity instruction, and where the defendant declined the court’s proposal to give a related limiting instruction. State v. Camacho, No. 59503-6-II (May 22, 2026, Motion to Publish Granted Jun 18, 2026)
Division III
Attempted Rape of a Child in the Second Degree – In a prosecution for Attempted Rape of a Child in the Second Degree, the defendant’s subjective belief about the intended victim’s age is relevant and material to prove his intent, but it is not a separate element that the State must prove. State v. Erlandson, No. 40207-0-III (Jun. 16, 2026, Published in part)
Washington Supreme Court
Vacating convictions – The crime-free time that is necessary for a vacatur applicant to be eligible for vacation under RCW 9.94A.640 does not start until the applicant is released from confinement for all convictions, not just released for the convictions that the applicant seeks to vacate. Vacatur applicants must present evidence of rehabilitation to assist the court in exercising discretion to grant or deny the application. State v. Abrams, No. 103058-4 (Apr. 30, 2026)
Editor’s note: The court explained in dicta that the rule of lenity does not automatically require courts to interpret statutes in the defendant’s favor.
Recall Petitions – A recall petition is legally insufficient if the petition alleges that the Secretary of State committed misfeasance by refusing to transmit a referendum to the attorney general, and if, as here, the bill that the referendum relates to includes an emergency clause and is therefore exempt from referendum. In re Recall of Hobbs, No. 104322-8 (Apr. 30, 2026)
Civil Discovery – Parties to a civil lawsuit may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to the lawsuit. CR 26(b)(1). Records of foster children and their families are privileged under RCW 74.04.060(1)(a). But RCW 74.04.060(1)(a) contains an exception that allows the state to provide records that are needed in a judicial proceeding that concerns the administration of the state’s child welfare program for foster children. The state may also provide an individual their own juvenile records without violating RCW 13.50.100. J.M.I. v. State, No. 104167-5 (Apr. 30, 2026)
Division I
Search and seizure – The state violates article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution by obtaining from a hotel, without a warrant, a receipt that shows the last four digits of an individual’s bank card. Here, the error was harmless because the untainted evidence was overwhelming. State v. Blackburn, No. 86238-3-I (Apr. 20, 2026)
Law of the case – Under the “law of the case doctrine,” the state must prove unnecessary offense elements that are added to the “to-convict” instruction if the state does not object to the addition. Here, the state added a time-frame element to the “to-convict” instruction for Count 8 that became the law of the case and then failed to prove that element. Thus, the court reversed the conviction for Count 8. State v. Blackburn, No. 86238-3-I (Apr. 20, 2026)
Persistent Offender Accountability Act – The three strikes law in the POAA does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment under the Washington Constitution as applied. While the POAA disproportionately impacts black men, courts apply the POAA the same way to all defendants. All defendants who meet the objective three strikes criteria receive life without parole. State v. Dugan, No. 85809-2-I (Apr. 20, 2026)
Right to a jury – Courts may rely on certified records of a defendant’s criminal history to determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether the defendant has three strikes under the Persistent Offender Accountability Act (POAA). The constitution does not require prior convictions to be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt because prior convictions are not offense elements. The US Supreme Court, in Erlinger, held that defendants are entitled under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to have a jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether their past offenses were committed on separate occasions for purposes of the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA). 602 U.S. 821 (2024). However, Erlinger’s holding is limited to resolving the ACCA’s “occasions” inquiry and does not overrule Washington’s well established precedent that a trial court can find prior convictions for purposes of the POAA’s three strikes law without submitting them to a jury. State v. Dugan, No. 85809-2-I (Apr. 20, 2026)
Open Public Meetings Act – The Telford factors for determining whether an agency is the “functional equivalent” of a public agency (and must therefore comply with the Public Records Act) do not apply to determinations of whether an agency is a public agency under the OPMA. 95 Wn. App. 149 (1999). The definition of “other state agency” in the OPMA is expressly limited to agencies created by statute. RCW 42.30.020(1)(a). By contrast, creation by statute is merely one factor to be weighed under Telford. Moreover, Telford did not discuss the OPMA. Here, the LDWG is partially composed of public agencies such as King County, and the City of Seattle. Nevertheless, the OPMA does not apply to the LDWG because the LDWG was created by a Memorandum of Agreement, not by statute. West v. Lower Duwamish Waterway Group, No. 87289-3-I (Apr. 20, 2026, Unpublished)
Open Public Meetings Act – A press conference at which a quorum of council members is present can be a public meeting subject to the notice requirements of the OPMA, even if some council members only appear in their “individual capacity” and some only passively receive information. West v. Burien City Council, No. 87686-4-I (Apr. 27, 2026, Unpublished)
Division II
Earned Release Time – Aggravated first degree murder is a “serious violent offense” under RCW 9.94A.729(3)(b), meaning the aggregate earned release time (ERT) for an aggravated first degree murder committed on or after July 1, 1990, and before July 1, 2003, may not exceed 15 percent of the sentence. In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of Benson, No. 61316-6-II (Apr. 28, 2026)
Division III
Offender Score – The amendments to RCW 9.94A.525(1)(b) that took effect on July 23, 2023, and that prohibit counting most juvenile felony adjudications in an offender score are not retroactive. Here, the defendant committed two felonies as an adult before the amendments and was sentenced after the amendments took effect. The sentencing court correctly applied the law that existed at the time the sentencing offense was committed by including the defendant’s juvenile felony adjudications in his offender score. State v. Boyce, No. 40700-4-III (Apr. 30, 2026)