Jury selection

Washington Supreme Court

GR 37 – GR 37 prohibits peremptory strikes if an objective observer could view the potential juror’s race as a factor in the peremptory strike.  GR 37 does not target discrimination against the potential juror’s gender identity.  The court provided several other bright line rules.  For example, if the state provides a “demeanor based” reason for a peremptory strike, then the state must follow the procedures in GR 37(i).  Otherwise, the appeals court cannot consider the “demeanor based” reason.  If the state provides a “presumptively invalid” reason for the peremptory strike, from the list in GR 37(h), then there is a presumption that an objective observer could view race as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge.  However, that presumption may be rebutted.  Here, an objective observer could not view race as a factor in the peremptory strike based on the totality of the circumstances.  The stricken juror was white, and the defendant was black.  That does not mean striking a white juror will never violate GR 37 since GR 37 is race neutral.  The juror viewed the legal system as unjust for people of color.  However, some jurors who expressed similar views were seated and some were stricken. The juror had strong political views and would not discuss their views about firearms in front of the group.  Concerns about a juror’s ability to participate in deliberations is a legitimate reason for a peremptory challenge.   There were no red flags and no evidence of discriminatory effect based on race.  State v. Hogan, No. 103824-1 (Jun. 4, 2026)

Division I

State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA) – Recently enacted “appeal prohibition statutes” such as RCW 36.70A.600(3), that prohibit appeals of local planning department actions that increase housing, do not bar administrative appeals of a Final Environmental Impact Statement when, as here, SEPA and the local agency’s code allow it.  WAC 197-11-680(3)(a)(iii), and SMC 25.05.680.  Friends of Ravena-Cowen v. City of Seattle, No. 88217-1-I (consolidated with No. 88252-0-I) (June 1, 2026)

Torts – The “special relationship” exception to the public duty doctrine allows a negligence action to proceed against a public agency when three elements are met: 1) direct contact or privity between the injured person and a government official that sets the injured person apart from the general public, 2) express assurances given by the public official, and 3) reasonable reliance by the injured person on the official’s assurances.  Here, all three elements were met where a hotel security guard called the police to report what sounded like a murder in progress in one of the hotel rooms, and where the guard relied on assurances that help was on the way.  The decedent’s estate sued the government call center for negligently classifying the call as a lower priority and causing a delayed response.  The case could proceed based on the “special relationship” exception notwithstanding that the caller was not the injured person.  Bartlett v. Valley Communications Center, No. 87600-7-I (June 1, 2026)

Division II

Land Use – A LUPA petitioner has the burden of demonstrating that the hearing examiner erred.  Here, the LUPA petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence to support its arguments that 1) the subject property was partially owned by someone other than the applicant, or 2) that the proposal violated the county’s density requirements.  Spanaway Concerned Citizens v. Pierce County, No. 60984-3-II (Jun. 2, 2026)

(Editor’s note: The concurrence argued that the hearing examiner lacked authority to conduct a title examination beyond confirming that the land use application contained an attestation of ownership.  And argued further that litigating title before a hearing examiner, which is not a court of law, could cloud the title.)