Jurisdiction
Washington Supreme Court:
Double jeopardy – Second degree assault with a deadly weapon, and harassment (threat to kill), are the same offense in fact when they are based on the same conduct. But they are not the same offense in law because neither conviction necessarily proves the other. The assault conviction requires proof of a higher mens rea (intentional v. knowing), and the harassment conviction requires proof of a more serious threat (threat to kill v. threat to cause bodily injury). Moreover, there is no clear evidence the legislature intended to prohibit separate punishments for each offense. Therefore, the two offenses are not the “same offense” for double jeopardy purposes. State v. Ray, No. 103509-8 (Sept. 11, 2025).
Division I:
Vagueness – The Prison Riot Statute (RCW 9.94.010) is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. The statute contains an implied mens rea element of intentional action. The statute contains an actus reas element of utilizing “force or violence, or the threat thereof.” The statute does not violate free speech, or the right to peaceably assemble. State v. Quijas, No. 86476-9-I (Sept. 8, 2025).
Double jeopardy – Convictions for Assault 1st Degree, and Rape 2nd Degree were the “same criminal conduct” for purposes of the offender score calculation, but the two convictions did not merge, and the trial court could impose separate punishments for each because each charge required proof of something the other did not (the Blockburger test). State v. Anderson, Jr., No. 86089-5-I (Sept. 8, 2025, unpublished).
Land Use Petition Act (LUPA) – A party must exhaust its administrative remedies to have standing under LUPA. RCW 36.70C.060(2)(d). Here, the Water District did not itself raise the issues to the hearing examiner that it wished to raise to the superior court in its LUPA appeal. However, another party (the County Department of Local Services) did. Therefore, the issues were preserved. That, combined with the fact that the Water District participated, at least minimally, at the administrative hearing before the hearing examiner (by appearing at the prehearing conference), meant the Water District exhausted its administrative remedies and had standing under LUPA. Woodinville Water District v. King County, No. 86736-9-I (Sept. 8, 2025, unpublished).
Division III:
Involuntary Treatment Act (ITA) – Superior courts have original subject matter jurisdiction to conduct involuntary treatment proceedings and to order less restrictive treatment alternatives. WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 6, and RCW 71.05.320. Here, the court did not exceed its authority when it directed the Developmental Disabilities Administration (DDA) to reassess C.E. and to reengage the placement process to effectuate the court’s own less restrictive alternative order. The court was not reviewing a final agency decision. Therefore, the procedures that are necessary for a superior court to have appellate jurisdiction under the APA (Ch. 34.05 RCW), such as exhaustion of administrative remedies, did not apply. In the Matter of the Detention of C.E., No. 40409-9-III (Sept. 9, 2025).
9th Circuit:
Jurisdiction – Timeliness of an appeal of a summary judgment order in a federal civil case is jurisdictional and is defined by 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a) which provides a 30-day appeal deadline starting from entry of the order. “Entry” of the order occurs when the district court files the order on the civil docket. To the extent the Federal Rules allow an additional 150 days to appeal collateral orders with no corresponding separate document, the Rules conflict with the statute and are thus invalid. Here, the defendants were prison officials defending against a civil §1983 action that the inmate plaintiff brought against them. The defendants waited 150 days to appeal the federal district court’s summary judgment order that the defendant’s lacked qualified immunity. Therefore, the appeals court no longer had jurisdiction to decide the merits of the appeal. McNeil v. Gittere, No. 23-3080 (9th Cir. Sept. 2, 2025)