Conflict
Division I
Land Use – A city may not enforce regulations against a landowner based solely on the conversion of a property into a condominium. Here, the owner converted a house and an accessory dwelling unit into two condominiums. The city claimed the change violated the city’s zoning code and water and sewer codes, not because of any physical changes to the property but based on the property’s conversion into a condominium form of ownership. The court held that treating the condominium form of ownership differently in this way violates the Washington Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act (WUCIOA) (specifically RCW 64.90.025(2)), and the Growth Management Act (GMA) chapter 36.70A RCW. Ladder Properties LLC v. City of Snoqualmie, No. 88063-2-I (Jul. 13, 2026)
Division II
Prosecutor Conflicts – A deputy prosecutor who is the victim of a crime is disqualified from prosecuting the case due to conflict, but the entire prosecutor’s office is generally not disqualified. The general rule is that office-wide disqualification is not required when a deputy prosecutor “is for any reason disqualified from a case.” The appearance of fairness doctrine does not apply to prosecutors performing their executive functions, and in any event, the prosecutor’s handling of this case did not appear unfair. State v. Spanjer, No. 61021-3-II (Jul. 14, 2026)
Editor’s note: compare this case to State v. Nickels, 195 Wn.2d 132, 456 P.3d 795 (2020) (holding that an elected county prosecutor’s former client conflict is imputed to all attorneys in the prosecuting attorney’s office.)
Division III
Receiving Unlawful Compensation – The word “compensation” in the Receiving Unlawful Compensation statute is not limited to money and includes sexual contact that a public servant receives in exchange for exercising official discretion to assist another with a “transaction.” RCW 9A.68.030(1)(a). The word “transaction” includes visits between a parent and child or a dependency case that the public servant assists with. Neither word is ambiguous, therefore the “ejusdem generis” canon of construction did not apply, and the court instead relied on dictionary definitions. However, the court explained that the outcome would have been the same even if ejusdem generis applied, and therefore the rule of lenity would not have required the court to resolve the ambiguity in the defendant’s favor even if the words had been ambiguous. State v. Tarver, No. 40603-2-III (Jul. 14, 2026)
Washington Supreme Court
GR 37 – GR 37 prohibits peremptory strikes if an objective observer could view the potential juror’s race as a factor in the peremptory strike. GR 37 does not target discrimination against the potential juror’s gender identity. The court provided several other bright line rules. For example, if the state provides a “demeanor based” reason for a peremptory strike, then the state must follow the procedures in GR 37(i). Otherwise, the appeals court cannot consider the “demeanor based” reason. If the state provides a “presumptively invalid” reason for the peremptory strike, from the list in GR 37(h), then there is a presumption that an objective observer could view race as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge. However, that presumption may be rebutted. Here, an objective observer could not view race as a factor in the peremptory strike based on the totality of the circumstances. The stricken juror was white, and the defendant was black. That does not mean striking a white juror will never violate GR 37 since GR 37 is race neutral. The juror viewed the legal system as unjust for people of color. However, some jurors who expressed similar views were seated and some were stricken. The juror had strong political views and would not discuss their views about firearms in front of the group. Concerns about a juror’s ability to participate in deliberations is a legitimate reason for a peremptory challenge. There were no red flags and no evidence of discriminatory effect based on race. State v. Hogan, No. 103824-1 (Jun. 4, 2026)
Division I
State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA) – Recently enacted “appeal prohibition statutes” such as RCW 36.70A.600(3), that prohibit appeals of local planning department actions that increase housing, do not bar administrative appeals of a Final Environmental Impact Statement when, as here, SEPA and the local agency’s code allow it. WAC 197-11-680(3)(a)(iii), and SMC 25.05.680. Friends of Ravena-Cowen v. City of Seattle, No. 88217-1-I (consolidated with No. 88252-0-I) (June 1, 2026)
Torts – The “special relationship” exception to the public duty doctrine allows a negligence action to proceed against a public agency when three elements are met: 1) direct contact or privity between the injured person and a government official that sets the injured person apart from the general public, 2) express assurances given by the public official, and 3) reasonable reliance by the injured person on the official’s assurances. Here, all three elements were met where a hotel security guard called the police to report what sounded like a murder in progress in one of the hotel rooms, and where the guard relied on assurances that help was on the way. The decedent’s estate sued the government call center for negligently classifying the call as a lower priority and causing a delayed response. The case could proceed based on the “special relationship” exception notwithstanding that the caller was not the injured person. Bartlett v. Valley Communications Center, No. 87600-7-I (June 1, 2026)
Division II
Land Use – A LUPA petitioner has the burden of demonstrating that the hearing examiner erred. Here, the LUPA petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence to support its arguments that 1) the subject property was partially owned by someone other than the applicant, or 2) that the proposal violated the county’s density requirements. Spanaway Concerned Citizens v. Pierce County, No. 60984-3-II (Jun. 2, 2026)
(Editor’s note: The concurrence argued that the hearing examiner lacked authority to conduct a title examination beyond confirming that the land use application contained an attestation of ownership. And argued further that litigating title before a hearing examiner, which is not a court of law, could cloud the title.)
United States Supreme Court
Peremptory Challenges – A trial court, to correctly apply the third step of Batson’s three-step test, must give the defendant a sufficient opportunity to rebut the race neutral reasons that the prosecutor provides for a peremptory strike. Pitchford v. Cain, No. 24–7351 (May 28, 2026)
(Editor’s Note: Washington has rejected Batson’s focus on purposeful discrimination and instead asks whether an objective observer “could” view race or ethnicity as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge and requires courts to analyze numerous additional factors. GR 37, State v. Jefferson, 192 Wash. 2d 225, 230 (2018), State v. Sum, 199 Wn.2d 627 (2022))
Federal Habeas – A prisoner who collaterally attacks the validity of his federal conviction must proceed through 28 U. S. C. §2255, not 18 U. S. C. §3582; the supposed invalidity of a conviction is not among the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that justify compassionate release. Fernandez v. United States, No. 24–556 (May 28, 2026)
Division I
Involuntary Treatment Act – County prosecutors are responsible for representing ITA petitioners that are not state hospitals or facilities. The AGO is responsible for representing ITA petitioners that are state hospitals or facilities. RCW 71.05.130. Here, the AGO represented the state hospital on the hospital’s petition for a 180-day less restrictive alternative order (LRO). The LRO provided that A.R. would be transferred to Aristo Healthcare, which is not a state hospital or facility. Meaning, the county prosecutor was then responsible for representing Aristo’s Designated Crisis Responder (DCR) when Aristo’s DCR filed the next 180-day petition. Thus, the trial court erred in denying the AGO’s motion to withdraw. In the Matter of the Detention of A.R., No. 87531-1-I (May 26, 2026)
GR 37 – An objective observer could not view race as a factor in the State’s peremptory challenge of an Asian juror where the GR 37 factors and the circumstances indicate the prosecutor’s concern was the juror’s negative views about the prison system, not the juror’s race. The trial court’s GR 37 analysis was incomplete. However, the appeals court analyzed the GR 37 factors de novo and held that the peremptory challenge did not violate GR 37. State v. Thompson, No. 85984-6-I (May 26, 2026)
Washington Supreme Court
Right to Counsel – A defendant is not completely denied counsel when his attorney declines to argue the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea at the sentencing hearing if: defense counsel remains present, defense counsel does not withdraw, is not conflicted, does not undermine the defendant’s position, and the defendant is allowed to make the argument. An allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel alone does not create a conflict or require substitution of counsel. Here, the defendant was not completely denied counsel and was, therefore, not entitled to automatic reversal. State v. Korsakas, No. 104065-2 (May 21, 2026)
Interfering with Reporting Domestic Violence – The Interfering with Reporting DV statute defines a single crime and is not an alternative means crime. RCW 9A.36.150. The alleged alternative acts in the statute do not criminalize the defendant’s conduct. Rather, they concern the acts of victims and witnesses and do not criminalize those acts. This decision resolves a split by affirming Division Three, and overturning Division One’s opinion in Nonog. State v. Buck, No. 104170-5 (May 14, 2026)
Division I
Appearance of Fairness Doctrine – A judicial proceeding satisfies the appearance of fairness doctrine if a reasonably prudent and disinterested person would conclude that all parties received a fair, impartial, and neutral hearing. Here, the jury administrator informed the judge, during a bench trial, that she overheard someone from a victim support organization tell one of the child victims to “remember this signal” and then saw her make a motion with her hand, before entering the courtroom. The trial judge’s failure to bring this to the parties’ attention before the trial ended, combined with the trial judge’s statement that he doubted that members of the victim support organization would engage in witness signaling, could cause a reasonable person to suspect judicial bias, and to believe that the defendant was denied a fair trial. Thus, the defendant is entitled to a new trial under the appearance of fairness doctrine. State v. Lester, No. 88956-7-I (May 18, 2026)
Division II
Sentencing – Monschke’s holding that mandatory life without parole is unconstitutional as applied to 18- to 20-year-old defendants does not apply to a defendant who was 22 years old when he committed the murders. The sentencing court was not required to consider the mitigating qualities of youth. State v. Pate, No. 60300-4-II (May 12, 2026, Unpublished)
First Amendment – A government agency may place reasonable viewpoint neutral, time place and manner restrictions on speech in a nonpublic forum. In addition, speech made with the intent to facilitate criminal conduct is unprotected speech. Here, the plaintiff had a history of sending vulgar offensive emails to agency staff. The agency responded by telling the plaintiff that he could only send emails to a single agency email address, unless he signed a “behavioral contract” (which he did not sign). The plaintiff violated the restriction. The agency again told the plaintiff to stop sending derogatory, harassing, or threatening emails, citing RCW 9A.76.180 (Intimidating a public servant). The plaintiff sued alleging a First Amendment violation. The trial court correctly dismissed the case. The plaintiff’s speech was not protected because it violated the agency’s reasonable restriction. Iceberg v. Tigerson, No. 60840-5-II (May 12, 2026, Unpublished)
Division I
Involuntary Treatment Act – Mental illness episodes that occur over a couple of days can be sufficient to support involuntary commitment without any other prior history of mental illness episodes or commitment. In the Matter of the Detention of H.T., No. 87418-7-I (May, 4, 2026)*
*Editor’s note: Division I withdrew its May 4, 2026 opinion in this case and substituted it with this new opinion: In the matter of the detention of H.T., No. 87418-7-I (Jun. 6, 2026)
Division III
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel – A defendant, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, must show both (1) deficient performance falling below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) prejudice – a reasonable probability of a different outcome absent the deficiency. Here, defense counsel was deficient by not objecting to prejudicial booking photos and unauthenticated surveillance footage coming in. But there was no prejudice because there was a reasonable probability that the defendant would still have been found guilty if the booking photos and unauthenticated surveillance footage had not come in. Thus, defense counsel was not ineffective. State v. Perry, No. 40122-7-III (Mat 5, 2026, Unpublished)
Conflict of Interest – A part time superior court commissioner who represents a criminal defendant in the same court where he/she is a commissioner does not create a concurrent conflict of interest under RPC 1.7(a)(1) because commissioners do not represent a client in their non-advocate role. Nor did the commissioner’s dual role violate the appearance of fairness doctrine (at least not as to the defendant). State v. West, No. 40242-8-III (May 7, 2026, Unpublished)
Editor’s note: The court did not reach the Code of Judicial Conduct (CJC) because the CJC was not properly raised. But see Ethics Advisory Opinions: 09-02, (Whether a part-time commissioner may appear as a lawyer in a case in the same court in which he/she serves as a part-time commissioner, without violating the CJC, depends on factors to be reviewed case-by-case), and 26-01 (Defense attorneys should not serve as pro tem judges in criminal cases in district courts in the same county where the defense attorney routinely practices in the superior court because that would undermine the public’s confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary)