Attenuation doctrine

Washington Supreme Court:

Juvenile court warrants – Juvenile Courts may not issue warrants unless the “individual circumstances” of the violation pose a “serious threat to public safety.” JuCR 7.16. Threats solely to the juvenile’s own safety do not meet this requirement. JuCR 7.16 does not conflict with RCW 13.40.040(1)(a) because juvenile courts can, and must, comply with both – the two can be harmonized by requiring juvenile courts to comply with the “threat to public safety” requirement. However, if there was a conflict, the statute would yield to the rule in this case because the issuance of warrants is procedural, which falls in the Supreme Court’s inherent, constitutional, and statutory power. State v. A.M.W., No. 103006-1 (August 14, 2025).
(Editor’s note: Justice Madsen’s dissent contains a discussion of the Supreme Court’s authority to promulgate procedural rules that is worth reading.)

Firearm rights restoration – A petition to restore firearms rights may be filed in any superior court in Washington and any Superior Court in Washington has the jurisdiction to hear it. WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 6. However, the general rule is that once a venue objection is made, and the court finds venue is improper, the court has only two options 1) transfer the petition to a proper venue, or 2) dismiss the petition. If the disqualifying conviction is from another state, the general rule regarding venue does not apply. Any Superior Court in Washington retains jurisdiction to decide the merits of the petition. Arends v. State, No. 103068-1 (Aug. 14, 2025).
(Editor’s Note: The Court agreed with the court of appeals that the petitioner did not have a “vested right,” under former RCW 9.41.040(4)(b), to file the petition in his county of residence. The vested rights doctrine does not apply to a form of procedure such as venue.)

Division I:

Attenuation doctrine – The attenuation doctrine applies in the Article 1, § 7 context when an intervening circumstance brings about a discovery beyond the foreseeable results of the police misconduct. Here, a third-party witness’s voluntary statements to law enforcement were an intervening circumstance going beyond the foreseeable results of the police improperly using CSS technology without a magistrate’s permission to locate the defendant’s phone. Thus, the statements were admissible. State v. Parker, No. 88034-9-I (Aug. 11, 2025).

Blake – A defendant is not entitled to resentencing under Blake if it is clear from the record that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence even without the offender score error. State v. Parker, No. 88034-9-I (Aug. 11, 2025).

Division II:

Blake – A DNA profile in CODIS was not collected “without authority of law,” in violation of Article 1, § 7, just because the sample was collected pursuant to a conviction that was subsequently vacated due to an unconstitutional criminal statute. Blake did not hold RCW 43.43.754, the statute that authorizes the collection and retention of DNA profiles in CODIS, to be unconstitutional. The State’s failure to notify the defendant that his conviction was vacated and his profile could be expunged did not amount to a violation of his procedural due process rights. State v. Munoz-Hernandez, No. 59255-0-II (August 12, 2025) .

Foreign case of interest:

Ineffective assistance – Refusing to present a legally untenable defense does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Criminal defense attorneys have an ethical obligation to refrain from advancing frivolous defenses, and an obligation to disclose to the tribunal any legal authority that is adverse to the client’s position. State v. Baverov, No. A-0274-23 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., Aug. 11, 2025) .