Posts by WAPA Staff
Weekly Roundup for the week of February 9, 2026
Washington Supreme Court
Land use petition act (LUPA) – A LUPA petitioner must strictly comply with both RCW 4.28.080 and RCW 36.70C.040 when serving a LUPA petition on a local government. Here, the petitioner’s first attempted service was timely because it was within LUPA’s 21-day SOL. RCW 36.70C.040(3). But it was improper because it was made on a front desk employee at City Hall who was not designated to receive service. RCW 4.28.080(2). The second attempted service was made on the City Manager, who was designated to receive it. But it was untimely because it was 24-days after the City emailed its decision canceling the petitioner’s land use application. The three-day extension of the 21-day SOL only applies when the city mails a written land use decision, not when it emails it. Chandrruangphen v. City of Sammamish, No. 103789-9 (Feb. 12, 2026).
(Editor’s note: Whether cancellation of a land use application is a final land use decision, or merely interlocutory, and thus not appealable under LUPA, was not before the court. The amendment to LUPA in 2024 allowing service on “the office of a person” did not apply because the attempted service happened in 2023. RCW 36.70C.040(5).)
Division I
Second amendment – A protection order requiring an individual to surrender firearms does not violate the Second Amendment when the court finds the individual poses a clear threat of physical violence to another. The threat does not have to be towards a specific identified person. Procedural Due Process only requires notice and an opportunity to be heard. Here, the defendant had an opportunity to be heard but he chose not to appear for the hearing. Thus, there was no Due Process violation. State v. Bell, No. 84534-9-I (consolidated with No. 87502-7-I) (Feb. 9, 2026).
Division III
Confrontation clause – The confrontation clause requires a criminal defendant be allowed to cross-examine any forensic scientist whose work the final, opining scientist relies, regardless of whether they prepared a report or formed any conclusions or opinions. State v. Dodson, No. 39755-6-III (February 10, 2026).
(Editor’s note: This case largely repeats the holdings of Smith v. Arizona and State v. Hall-Haught. It appears to be published largely to voice dissatisfaction with the harmless error standard.)
Foreign Case of Interest
Second amendment – Prohibiting the concealed carrying of switchblade knives in public is a restriction supported by our Nation’s history and tradition of arms regulations. Knife Rights, Inc. v. Bonta, No. 24-5536 (9th Cir. January 30, 2026).
Weekly Roundup for the week of February 2nd, 2026
U.S. Supreme Court
Community caretaking – An officer need not have “probable cause” or “reasonable suspicion” to believe an occupant is in need of emergency aid to enter a home without a warrant to render assistance. Those standards are related to criminal investigations. An officer need only have an “objectively reasonable basis” to believe that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such an injury to justify a warrantless intrusion. Case v. Montana, No. 24-624 (January 14, 2026).
(Editor’s note: Essentially, this opinion rejects the defendant’s attempt to narrow the Court’s decision in Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006) and reaffirms that decision.)
Division I
Eyewitness identification – A trial court abuses its discretion by suppressing an identification procedure as inherently suggestive without considering if the procedure was necessary due to exigent circumstances, such as a single-photo showup identification when the suspect may still be in the area. State v. Yellowcalf, No. 86685-1-I (Jan. 2, 2026).
Personal jurisdiction – A court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, in civil cases, requires compliance with both the state long-arm statute (RCW 4.28.185) and the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause. Due process requires: (1) purposeful minimum contacts must exist between the defendant and the forum state, (2) the plaintiff’s injuries must arise out of or relate to those minimum contacts, and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable, that is, consistent with notions of fair play and substantial justice. King County v. Aquatherm, No. 85572-7-I (consolidated with No. 85595-6-I) (Feb. 2, 2026, unpublished).
(Editor’s note: Motion to publish granted on March 23, 2026.)
Foreign Cases of Interest
Standing – Where the plaintiff is an organization, they can establish standing by either 1) claiming the defendant injured the organization, or 2) claiming the defendant injured the organization’s members. Here, the alleged injuries to the organization were all caused by the plaintiffs’ own voluntary decisions to spend money on their cause, which does not count. And, alternative 2) was not satisfied because the juveniles were not members of the plaintiff organizations. The juveniles may not have even known the organizations existed and had no control over the organization’s decisions. Nor was there a special relationship between the organization and the juveniles combined with any inability of the juveniles to sue the defendants themselves. Justice 360 v. South Carolina Dept. of Juvenile Justice, No. 25-1032 (4th Cir., Jan. 29, 2026).
(Editor’s note: the court recognized the Federal Circuits have disagreed on these issues, and the 9th and 11th Circuits have found organizations had standing in similar cases.)
Second amendment – Criminalizing deserializing firearms is consistent with the nations’ historical tradition of firearm regulation. Although firearms were not serialized when the Second Amendment was ratified, founding-era regulations established various measures to inventory and track firearms. The Bruen standard should not be misunderstood to mean that modern firearm regulations require close founding-era comparators. United States v. Reyna, No. 23-1231 (7th Cir. Jan. 28, 2026).
Weekly Roundup for the week of January 26
Washington Supreme Court
Elections – A county auditor, after receiving a valid petition to amend a first-class city’s charter, must put the amendment on the ballot and submit it to the voters “at the next regular municipal election, occurring thirty days or more after said petition is filed.” RCW 35.22.120. The phrase “next regular municipal election” means the next municipal election, whether that is a general or a special election. A Better Richland v. Chilton, No. 103715-5 (Jan. 29, 2026).
9th Circuit
Second amendment – Criminalizing the possession of firearms by noncitizens unlawfully present in the United States is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation and does not run afoul of the Second Amendment. United States v. Vazquez-Ramirez, No. 24-3544 (Jan. 2, 2026).
(Editor’s note: The case analyzes the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A), but the same logic would presumably apply to RCW 9.41.171, Alien possession of firearms.)
Weekly Roundup for the week of January 19th, 2026
U.S. Supreme Court:
Restitution – Restitution under the Mandatory Crime Victim’s Restitution Act of 1996 is criminal punishment for purposes of the ex post facto clause and cannot be imposed on defendants who committed their crimes before passage of the Act. Ellingburg v. United States, No. 24-482 (January 20, 2026).
(Editor’s note: This case deals with restitution under a federal provision of law and is not binding on cases where restitution is ordered pursuant to state law. The case is included to defend against frivolous arguments that the U.S. Supreme Court has held that all restitution is punitive. The case only holds that it is punitive for the purposes of an ex post facto analysis. Washington courts have held that restitution under the SRA is both compensatory and punitive, and restitution under the SRA cannot be imposed for crimes committed prior to the effective date of the Act.)
Division I:
Right to silence – An individual may invoke the right to silence before they are in custody or the subject of suspicion or investigation because the right originates from the Fifth Amendment, not Miranda (citing State v. Easter, 130 Wn.2d 228, 243 (1996)). Here, the defendant invoked the right when her attorney informed police, before she was in custody or under arrest, not to contact the defendant. The state violated the right by eliciting testimony, during its case in chief, that the defendant failed to reach out to investigators, call, check in, or provide information about the case. The case Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. 178 (2013) did not overrule Easter because the court in Salinas did not decide whether defendants can assert the right to silence pre-custody and pre-arrest. Instead, the court in Salinas held the defendant did not invoke his right to silence. State v. Ianniciello, No. 86711-3-I (Jan. 20, 2026, substitute published opinion)
WEEKLY ROUNDUP for Weeks of December 22 and 29
Division I:
Evidence – A rational trier of fact could find a defendant intended to deliver controlled substances based on evidence that the defendant 1) was homeless but possessed 10 grams of meth and 50 fentanyl pills in separate receptacles with a street value of up to $800, 2) possessed $200 in denominations of a $100 bill and five $20 bills, 3) another person had been sitting in the defendant’s truck with him, near where a second pipe used for ingesting drugs was found, 4) deputy testimony that the size of the baggie was larger than normal for personal use, and that the other circumstances above indicated intent to deliver. State v. Hoover, No. 87203-6-I (Dec. 22, 2025, published in part).
Restitution – Before waiving restitution to an insurance company under RCW 9.94A.753(3), a trial court must find both that the defendant does not have a current ability to pay and that the defendant will likely not have a future ability to pay. Here, because the defendant had no physical or mental debilitation that would prevent work in the future, the court did not err in ordering restitution to the insurance company. State v. Morgan, No. 86639-7-I (Dec. 29, 2025, Published in part).
Division II:
Evidence – The second-degree burglary statute does not require a “nexus” between the unlawful entry and the crime the defendant intends to commit in the building. Here, the defendant committed second degree burglary by 1) unlawfully entering Winco Foods in violation of a trespass order, and 2) with the intent to commit the crime of violating a Domestic Violence No Contact Order (the defendant entered the store together with the protected person). State v. Veith, No. 59783-7-II (Dec. 23, 2025, unpublished).
9th Circuit:
Social media posts – When a social media company provides an authentication of social media posts, they authenticate the technical attributes of the records, not the substance of the posts. The substance of the posts is authenticated via ER 901. United States v. Allen, No. 24-804 (November 17, 2025).
WEEKLY ROUNDUP FOR THE WEEK OF December 15
Washington Supreme Court:
Public Records Act (PRA) – DBIA Services, a private nonprofit corporation, is the functional equivalent of a government agency and thus subject to the PRA. Two of the four Telford factors weighed in favor of functional equivalence, and two weighed against it. Telford v. Thurston Co. BOCC, 95 Wn. App. 149 (1999). But DBIA’s immunity from the PRA would frustrate the PRA’s goal of government transparency. Thus, all things considered, DBIA is the functional equivalent of a government agency. Horvath v. DBIA Services DBA Metropolitan Improvement District, No. 10333907 (Dec. 18, 2025).
(Editor’s note: One justice dissented because she did not believe any of the Telford factors weighed in favor of functional equivalence. She would have affirmed the trial court and the Court of Appeals.)
Division I:
Right to silence – Not contacting the police to inquire about the continuing investigation into the unsolved murder of a loved one can constitute “silence” under the Fifth Amendment, and, after an invocation, such an apparent lack of concern is inadmissible in the State’s case-in-chief in a subsequent homicide trial. State v. Ianniciello, No. 86711-3-I (Dec. 15, 2025).
Division III:
Public trial – The public trial right attaches to in-chamber discussions of dismissing a member of the venire for cause. Such a closure is unjustified without a Bone Club analysis. State v. Reyna, No. 39859-5-III (Dec. 18, 2025).
(Editor’s note: The court declined to apply a de minimus exception to this violation because, if it had, “…we would not be adequately reminding [the judge and the prosecutor] of their important functions, which include upholding established constitutional rights.”)
WEEKLY ROUNDUP FOR THE WEEK OF Weeks of November 25, December 1 & 8
U.S. Supreme Court:
Party presentation rule – Under the party-presentation rule the parties frame the issues for decision, and the court serves as neutral arbiter of matters the parties present. A court violates the party-presentation rule by granting relief on a claim that the defendant never asserted. In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth Circuit “departed so drastically from the principle of party presentation as to constitute an abuse of discretion.” Clark v. Sweeney, No. 25-53 (Nov. 24, 2025).
Washington Supreme Court:
Recall Petitions – When a recall petition charges an elected official with violating the Open Public Meetings Act (OPMA), the petitioner must have knowledge of facts indicating an intent to violate the OPMA. Here, the record indicated that the commissioner attended an executive session where legal counsel was not present, and that therefore the attorney-client privilege exception to the OPMA did not apply. But the record failed to indicate that the petitioner had personal knowledge that the commissioner intended to violate the OPMA. Thus, the recall petition was legally insufficient. In Re Petition for Recall of Commissioner Lisa Olsen, No. 104087-3 (Dec. 4, 2025).
Blake – Individuals with invalidated convictions do not have a right to be reimbursed for community service work performed in lieu of LFOs under the Equal Protection Clause. The individuals alleging Equal Protection violations did not prove disparate treatment because the community service option was not limited to the poor. Further, equal protection claims require “significant state action” which the court found lacking because the community service was performed at nonprofit organizations and not for the State. State v. Danielson, No. 103627-2 (Dec. 11, 2025)
Division I:
Right to Appeal – Ordinarily, entry of a guilty plea that admits the sufficiency of the state’s evidence waives any subsequent challenge to that evidence. And ordinarily, a sentence within the standard range shall not be appealed. RCW 9.94A.585(1). But a defendant may reserve the right to appeal the denial of his motions to suppress evidence if the state agrees to it when the defendant enters his guilty plea (which the state did in this case). State v. Nielsen, No. 86402-5-I (Nov. 24, 2025, unpublished).
(Editor’s note: A better practice is for the parties agree to a stipulated facts bench trial following the denial of the defendant’s motions to suppress. Then the defendant can appeal the denial of his motions to suppress, and the appeals court will not have to struggle with the reservation of a right to appeal in a guilty plea statement that conflicts with the ordinary rules about what can be appealed.)
Competency – Where the evidence shows that DSHS made significant efforts to provide timely restoration services, but several structural barriers and resource limitations outside of its control left it unable to do so, a trial court abuses its discretion holding DSHS in contempt, as inability to comply is an affirmative defense to contempt. Courts may not impose sanctions for contempt based solely on a violation of the time requirements in RCW 10.77.605. RCW 10.77.605(9). However, courts may impose sanctions for contempt if the order that DSHS violated required DSHS to comply with the time requirements of due process (assuming DSHS is able to comply). State v. DSHS, No. 87697-0-I (Dec. 8, 2025).
Division II:
Evidence – A trial court does not abuse its discretion by allowing the state to refresh a witness’s recollection with an exhibit that the court excluded from evidence as a discovery sanction. A court has wide discretion to determine the sanction for a discovery violation and to determine whether something can be used to refresh a witness’ memory. State v. Newberry, No. 58893-5-II (Nov. 25, 2025, unpublished).
Division III:
Public Records Act (PRA) – A court may sanction a PRA plaintiff for failing to answer questions, or evading questions, during a deposition. An initial five-day response letter does not violate the PRA for failing to provide an estimated response time if the agency sent the letter during the COVID-19 pandemic when the governor paused the operation of RCW 42.56.520(1). An agency does not fail to produce responsive records if the requester asked for all emails that person A sent to the requester, and the agency withholds emails that person B sent to the requester using person A’s email account. The standard of review is de novo for reviewing a trial court’s decision to grant an injunction to protect an agency from harassing records requests from a prisoner, per RCW 42.56.565, if the trial court’s decision was based on a documentary record, not on live witness testimony. Here, the trial court erred in granting the injunction because the evidence of harassment was insufficient to support the injunction. Noyola v. Washington State DOC, No. 39698-3-III (Motion to Publish granted Dec. 9, 2025).
Foreign case of interest:
Takings – A county ordinance was enacted during the COVID-19 pandemic that prohibited all access to privately-owned beaches. County officers, to enforce the ordinance, entered the landowner’s property and excluded the landowners under threat of arrest. This was a “textbook physical taking” that entitled the plaintiffs to just compensation under U.S. Const. amend. V. Alford v. Walton County, No. 21-13999 (Nov. 17, 2025 11th Cir).
Weapons – A steak knife with a rounded tip and a 4 ½ inch blade is not a per se “weapon”. State v. Cortes, 374 Or. 461 (2025).
WEEKLY ROUNDUP FOR THE WEEK OF November 10th
Washington Supreme Court:
Youthful offenders – Failure to meaningfully consider the mitigating qualities of youth in sentencing when requested is an abuse of discretion. A youthful defendant need not present any evidence to support a claim of youthfulness. Defendants need not object to preserve the error, nor need they allege ineffective assistance of counsel to appeal a failure to meaningfully consider the mitigating qualities of youth. Although the court must consider youthfulness, the court retains the discretion to not grant a mitigated sentence. State v. Ellis, No. 102378-2 (November 13, 2025).
Restitution – When restitution is solely compensatory, it is not “punishment” for the purposes of the excessive fines clause. State v. Ellis, No. 102378-2 (November 13, 2025).
WEEKLY ROUNDUP FOR THE WEEK OF November 3rd
Washington Supreme Court:
Workers’ compensation – The “traveling employee doctrine” applies when an employee contracts an occupational disease while traveling for work. An “occupational disease” is a disease that arises naturally and proximately out of employment. An employee who contracts an occupational disease in the course of employment is entitled to workers’ compensation. RCW 51.32.180. Courts should liberally construe the term “arises naturally” in favor of finding coverage. Here, the COVID-19 the plaintiff likely contracted either while working or while traveling for work as an Alaskan Airlines flight attendant could be an occupational disease. Azorit-Wortham v. Department of Labor and Industries, No. 103488-1, (Nov. 6, 2025).
Division II:
Jury selection – The voir dire question, “Does anybody here feel like they would not be able to convict based on testimony alone?” does not improperly implicate the unique facts of the case or improperly commit potential jurors to a verdict. State v. Camacho, No. 59503-6-II (October 28, 2025, unpublished).
Involuntary Treatment Act – Involuntary commitment pursuant to a nonunanimous jury verdict does not violate equal protection because there is a rational basis for the different jury unanimity rules under the ITA and the Sexually Violent Predator Act. In the Matter of the Det. of J.S., No. 59484-6-II (Nov. 4, 2025, unpublished).