WEEKLY ROUNDUP FOR THE WEEK OF June 2, 2025
Division II:
Premeditation – WPIC 26.01.01, which states, “[t]he law requires some time, however long or short, in which a design to kill is deliberately formed,” does not misstate RCW 9A.32.020(1), which states premeditation must be of, “more than a moment in point of time.” Nor is it a comment on the evidence. State v. Hribar, No. 58982-6-II (June 3, 2025).
Felony firearm registration – The felony firearm offender registration statute, RCW 9.41.330, does not authorize a registration requirement for unarmed accomplices. State v. Couch, No. 58122-1-II (June 3, 2025).
Competency restoration – RCW 10.77.068(9) creates a statutory bar to an award of sanctions for the failure to meet deadlines for admission to the state hospital for competency restoration. State v. Lockhart, No. 59738-1-II (June 3, 2025).
(Editor’s note: The Court of Appeals’ decision is based on the trial court’s use of the pattern form, which indicated that the Order was rooted solely in the statute. Therefore, the statute barred a remedy of sanctions. Prosecutors should anticipate defense efforts to modify the pattern forms.)
Dismissal – A District Court abuses its discretion by denying the State’s Motion to dismiss pursuant to CrRLJ 8.3(a) (allowing the defendant to change his plea to guilty) when the State has refiled the case as a felony in Superior Court. State v. Taylor, No. 59042-5-II (May 20, 2025, unpublished).
Division III:
Public records – The court applied the “definitive response test” from Cousins v. State, 546 P.3d 415 (Wash. 2024) retroactively, even though Cousins did not “…impose a retroactive standard of strict compliance” as “such an approach would be entirely inconsistent with the balanced, functional approach taken by our precedent….” Cousins at 433. In this case, the county’s closing letter did not trigger the statute of limitations because the letter did not say the 1-year SOL had started to run, and did not say the requester may ask follow-up questions for a reasonable time. Here, the requester was entitled to attorney’s fees because he prevailed on the appeal of the summary judgment motion. Hood v. Stevens County, No. 39811-1-III (Jun. 3, 2025, unpublished).