WEEKLY ROUNDUP FOR MAY 17, 2019
Washington Supreme Court
Plain View. Inadvertence is not a separate element required under the plain view doctrine. Thus, a plain view seizure is legal when the police (1) have a valid justification to be in an otherwise protected area, provided that they are not there on a pretext, and (2) are immediately able to realize the evidence they see is associated with criminal activity. Law enforcement’s warrantless seizure of a defendant’s bloody clothing from the defendant’s hospital room was lawful where the officer’s presence in the hospital room was lawful and the police could reasonably conclude that the seized items had evidentiary value with respect to the current arson and assault investigation. State v. Morgan, No. 96017-8 (May 16, 2019). Justices Madsen and Gordon McCloud dissented. (Snohomish County – Seth Aaron Fine).
Impeachment Evidence and Harmless Error. The erroneous exclusion of impeachment evidence is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if, in light of the entire record, the court is convinced that the jury would have reached the same verdict absent the error. There is no eyewitness prerequisite to a finding of harmless error. When the victim’s account is corroborated by numerous other witnesses and the defendant’s account was highly implausible and/or directly refuted by other witnesses, the erroneous exclusion of U Visa evidence is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Romero-Ochoa, No. 95905-6 (May 16, 2019). (Pierce County.)
Controlled Substances. When a defendant has a previous conviction under chapter 69.50 RCW, RCW 69.50.408 automatically doubles the maximum sentence and the trial court does not have discretion to treat 60 months as the maximum sentence. The standard range for such a defendant is that in the SRA grid. State v. Cyr, COA No. 50912-1-II (May 14, 2019).
Pro Se Criminal Defendants. The defendant, who presented an unorthodox and ultimately unsuccessful defendant was properly found to be competent to represent himself. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. Equivocal statements made early on in a Faretta hearing will not taint a defendant’s fina, unequivocal waiver of counsel. The trial court was not required to conduct a second Faretta hearing after the defendant filed a motion requesting “a new counsel advisor.” United States v. Audette, No. 17-10017 (9th Cir. May 14, 2019).
American Bar Association
Obligations of Prosecutors in Negotiating Plea Bargains for Misdemeanor Offenses. Model Rules 1.1, 1.3, 3.8(a), (b), and (c), 4.1, 4.3, 5.1, 5.3, and 8.4(a), (c) and (d) impose obligations on prosecutors when entering into plea bargains with persons accused of misdemeanors. These obligations include the duty to ensure that each charge incident to a plea has an adequate foundation in fact and law, to ensure that the accused is informed of the right to counsel and the procedure for securing counsel, to avoid plea negotiations that jeopardize the accused’s ability to secure counsel, and, irrespective of whether an unrepresented accused has invoked the right to counsel, to avoid offering pleas on terms that knowingly misrepresent the consequences of acceptance or otherwise pressure or improperly induce acceptance on the part of the accused. American Bar Association Formal Opinion 486 (May 9, 2019).
Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board
Prosecutor Discipline. A commonwealth attorney received a public reprimand for listening to a jail phone call between a defendant and his attorney, which was recorded because the attorney had not registered his phone number with the jail. Although the attorney’s supervisors concluded that the attorney client privilege was waived as the defendant and the attorney were informed at the beginning of the call that it was being recorded, the disciplinary board found that the commonwealth attorney violated RPC 3.3, which states that “In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person.” In re Matter of Thacher, VSB Docket No. 18-053-111919 (May 7, 2019).
WEEKLY ROUNDUP FOR MAY 10,2019
Washington Supreme Court
Firearm Rights. The sheriff is not required to issue a concealed pistol licence to an individual whose sealed juvenile record includes adjudications for class A felonies. A sealed juvenile adjudication still exist as a matter of state law. A sealing order does not constitute an expungement of the juvenile offense. A sealed juvenile adjudication still exists, it is merely hidden from the view of the general public. A juvenile’s class A felony adjudication subjects him to federal law which makes it unlawful for him to “possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Barr v. Snohomish County Sheriff, No. 96072-1 (May 9, 2019). [Editor’s Note: The Court expressly declined to decide whether state law prohibits a juvenile whose class A adjudications have been sealed is prohibited from possessing or carrying a firearm under state law.]. (Snoco Lyndsey Downs)
Adult Sentencing for Defendants Who Committed Their Crimes Prior to Their Eighteenth Birthday. A defendant whose sentence was imposed prior to the issuance of Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1 (2017), which grants to the trial court absolute discretion to depart from the standard sentencing ranges and mandatory sentence enhancements for defendants being sentenced under the SRA for offenses committed prior to their eighteenth birthday, is not entitled to collateral relief unless he can demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that his sentence would have been shorter if the trial court had absolute discretion to depart from the SRA at the time of sentencing. Because the judge sentenced this defendant to the top of the standard sentencing range, the Court declines to consider whether Houston-Sconiers is a significant material change in the law that applies retroactively to cases on collateral reivew. In re Personal Restraint of Meippen, No. 95394-5 (May 9, 2019). Justices Wiggins, González, Yu and Gordon McCloud dissented on the grounds that Houston-Sconiers is a significant thange of law that applies retroactively on collateral review and that would support a remand for a reference hearing. (King County Ann Summers and Amy Meckling)
Seizure. The defendant bears the burden of proving a seizure occurred in violation of article I, section 7. A seizure occurs for article I, section 7, when an officer’s words and action would have conveyed to an innocent person that his or movements are being restricted. Officers need not create a complete obstruction of an individual’s movements in order for the encounter to become a seizure. In the instant case, the defendant was seized when officers asked for proof of his identity under a totality of the circumstances analysis as (1) the defendant was seated in a parked car that was flanked by cars parked in each of the adjoining spaces when the two uniformed officers stood adjacent to the vehicle’s doors, such that neither the defendant nor his passenger would have been able to open the doors and walk away from the vehicle without the officers moving or giving way; (2) the defendant could not move his vehicle in reverse without risking his car making contact with one or both of the officers and a barrier prevented the vehicle from pulling forward, (3) the officers illuminated the interior of the vehicle with flashlights, and (4) the officers used a ruse to begin the contact, asking “Is this Taylor’s car?” The seizure was unlawful as the officers did not observe any defendant-specific conduct prior to approaching the vehicle. State v. Johnson, COA No. 77720-3-I (May 6, 2019).
Domestic Violence. Statements the non-testifying victim made to health care providers that were admitted pursuant to ER 803(a)(4), in conjunction with a certified copy of the defendant’s driver’s license, and a redacted certified copy of the no contact order, was sufficient to establish that the defendant committed the crime of misdemeanor violation of the no-contact order. Sufficient evidence, however, does not support the conviction for assault in the second degree in violation of RCW 9A.36.021(1)(a), as the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant recklessly inflicted substantial bodily harm during an intentional assault. While the evidence showed the defendant fractured the victim’s finger, there was no evidence that the defendant knew of and disregarded a substantial risk that he would fracture the victim’s finger when he grabbed the phone from her hand. State v. Melland, COA No. 76617-1-I (May 6, 2019).
Legal Update for Washington State Law Enforcement
The April 2019 edition of the Legal Update for Washington State Law Enforcement, which is authored by John Wasberg and which is hosted on the Washington Association of Sheriffs and Police Chief’s web site is now available.
Florida Supreme Court
Judges in Romantic Relationships with Attorneys. A judge must recuse in any case handled by the attorney who is in a romantic relationship with the judge. The judge must disclose the relationship with the attorney in cases where one side is represented by the firm that has a relationship with the attorney. The judge need not automatically recuse from cases involving the firm with whom the attorney is associated so long as it is clearly established that the attorney derives no personal benefit from cases handled by other members of the firm and the judge is careful to observe strict objectivity in ruling on any motions to disqualify that may stem from revealing the relationship. Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee, Opinion No. 2019-16 (Apr. 25, 2019).
WEEKLY ROUNDUP FOR APRIL 26, 2019 & MAY 3, 2019
Washington Supreme Court
Exceptional Sentence. The trial court was not collaterally estopped from imposing an exceptional sentence at a resentencing hearing that was necessitated by the reversal of four of seven convictions, by its decision not to impose an exceptional sentence as the original sentencing hearing. The presumption of judicial vindictiveness does not apply when the overall length of the new sentence is lower than the original sentence. The presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness does not prevent the State from recommending an exceptional sentence at a resentencing hearing after not requested one at the original hearing, as the prosecutor at each sentencing hearing must decide whether the length of a standard range sufficient given the facts of the case. State v. Brown, No. 95734-7 (May 2, 2019). Justice Gordon McCloud was the lone dissenter.
Clerk’s Bonds. RCW 36.23.020 allows a superior court to increase the amount of the clerk’s bond. The superior court’s authority is not capped by RCW 36.16.050, which limits the maximum bond that a clerk must post before assuming office at the amount set for the treasurer in the same county. Riddle v. Elofson, No. 95959-5 (Apr. 25, 2019). Plurality decision with Justices Yu, Madsen, and Fairhurst dissenting on the grounds that the judges exceeded their statutory authority by ordering the clerk to double the amount of her official bond without any prior notice or opportunity to be heard.
Writs of Prohibition. Whether a writ of prohibition will issue is a narrow inquiry that looks only to the question of power and jurisdiction of an inferior court. A writ will not issue when the petitioner may be able to obtain relief through a preliminary injunction and declaratory judgment. Riddle v. Elofson, No. 95959-5 (Apr. 25, 2019). Plurality decision with Justices Yu, Madsen, and Fairhurst dissenting on the grounds that the extraordinary circumstances presented support the extraordinary remedy of prohibition.
On April 30, 2019, the Washington Supreme Court accepted review in the following matters:
Aggravated First Degree Murder and “Juveniles.” State v. Delbosque, No. 96709-1. Mason County– State’s Petition for Review. Issues presented: (1) Whether the Court of Appeals improperly vacated the trial court’s minimum term for a “juvenile” convicted of aggravated first degree due to its misallocation of the burden of proof and persuasion, by treating age as a per se mitigating factor, and by misapplying the standard of review. (2) Whether the defendant has a constitutional right to appeal his minimum term. COA opinion reported at 6 Wn. App. 2d 407 (2018). Petition for review pleadings available here.
Duty to Investigate. Wrigley v. State of Wash., DSHS, No. 96830-6. Government’s Petition for Review. Issues presented: Whether RCW 26.44.010 and .050 require an investigation of allegations of possible future abuse or neglect. COA opinion reported at 5 Wn. App. 2d 909 (2018) Petition for review pleadings available here.
Single Subject Requirement. Am. Hotel & Lodging Ass’n. v. City of Seattle, No. 96781-4. Government’s Petition for Review. Issues: Whether Seattle’s I-124, violates the City’s single subject requirement? COA opinion reported at 6 Wn. App. 2d 928 (2018). Petition for review pleadings available here.
Garnishments. Fireside Bank v. Askins, No. 96853-5. Whether a trial court may enforce the regulatory protections of the Collection Agency Act (CAA), when a “collection agency” “collected and attempted to collect, through writs of garnishment,” inflated judgment balances. COA opinion reported at 6 Wn. App. 2d 431 (2018). Petition for review pleadings available here.
Double Jeopardy. State v. Zhao, 157 Wn.2d 188 (2006), which allows a person to plead guilty to a fictitious crime, does not provide a basis to avoid double jeopardy and convict a person for two crimes based on one criminal act. State v. Robinson, COA No. 76648-1-I (Apr. 22, 2019).
Theft of a Motor Vehicle. A snowmobile is not a “motor vehicle” for purposes of RCW 9A.56.65, which makes it a class B felony to commit theft of a motor vehicle. State v. Tucker, COA No. 35530-6-III (May 2, 2019). Judge Korsmo dissented.
Seizure. A defendant was seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when two patrol cars blocked the defendant’s vehicles only exit from a dead end alley and two officers approached the passenger and driver side windows. Since the officers lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the seizure was unlawful. State v. Carriero, COA No. 35560-8-III (Apr. 25, 2019). Judge Korsmo dissented.
Malicious Prosecution. The reversal of plaintiff’s conviction on basis of the exclusionary rule is not a favorable termination, for purposes of a malicious prosecution claim, because the reversal does not address plaintiff’s guilt or innocence. Mills v. City of Covina, No. 17-56343 (9th Cir. Apr. 24, 2019).
Parking Enforcement. The common parking enforcement practice known as “chalking,” whereby parking enforcement officers use chalk to mark the tires of parked vehicles to track how long they have been parked, is a search that is subject to the Fourth Amendment. Neither the automobile exception nor the community caretaking exceptions to the warrant requirement supports chalking. Taylor v. City of Saginaw, No. 17-2126 (6th Cir. Apr. 22, 2019).
WEEKLY ROUNDUP FOR APRIL 12th, 2019
Washington Supreme Court
Landlord Liability. A property owner-landlord is liable for injuries that occur on its property when the lessee has exclusive possession at the time of the accident but only priority use under the lease and the landlord has contracted to maintain and repair the premises. Adamson v. Port of Bellingham, No. 96187-5 (Apr. 11, 2019).
Necessity Defense. A defendant who was charged with burglary in the second degree after he broke into a pipeline facility and turned off a valve, which stopped the flow of Canadian tar sands oil to refineries in Skagit and Whatcom Counties, was entitled to tender his common law necessity defense to the jury. The defendant contended that his commission of the crime was necessary to avoid harm to the climate, as governments had failed to meaningfully address the crisis of climate change. State v. Ward, COA No. 77044-6-I (Apr. 8, 2019).
Self-Defense. Although the lawfulness of the defendant’s first “warning shot” was not at issue, the giving of a first aggressor instruction without an accompanying lawful defense of another instruction prejudiced the defendant’s ability to argue his theory of the case. State v. Espinosa, COA No. 76894-8-I (Apr. 8, 2019).
Mandatory Legal Financial Obligations. A trial court need not consider a defendant’s past, present, or future ability to pay when it imposes the mandatory victim penalty assessment. The trial court may not remit the mandatory LFOs. Imposition of the mandatory LFOs does not violate a defendant’s right to due process. A county clerk possesses the authority to require a defendant to annually verify her SSI status. Requiring a defendant to annually verify her SSI status is not an “enforcement action” that will trigger an inquiry into a defendant’s ability to pay. State v. Conway, COA No. 50032-9-II (Apr. 9, 2019).
Cannabis and Zoning. Neither Washington’s Growth Management Act, chapter 36.70A RCW, nor the State’s marijuana licensing laws require the Washington State Liquor and Cannabis Board to defer to local zoning laws when making licensing decisions. While the Board may consider zoning restrictions in making licensing decisions, doing so is not required under current marijuana law. A license does not authorize the siting of a marijuana business, zoning laws remain in full force regardless of whether a license is issued. Kittitas County v. Washington State Liquor and Cannabis Board, COA No. 35874-7-III (Apr. 11, 2019).
“Profile Testimony.” Defense counsel provided constitutionally inadequate representation by failing to object to “profile testimony” at trial. While the State may admit evidence about the inability of a felon to lawfully obtain a gun, evidence of the high probability that any gun possessed by a felon is stolen or that one possessing a stolen firearm is likely to flee and discard the firearm when approached by a law enforcement officer constitutes improper “profile testimony” that implicates ER 402, 403, 404(b), and 702. State v. Crow, COA No. 35316-8-III (Apr. 9, 2019). Judge Korsmo dissented. [Editor’s note: The majority’s ruling conflicts with Division II’s opinion in State v. Avendano-Lopez, 79 Wn. App. 706 (1995).]
Offender Scores. The State must produce evidence to support the existence of prior convictions at sentencing. Pre-sentencing discussions of prior history and defense counsel’s acknowledgment of the State’s offender score will not substitute. State v. Crow, COA No. 35316-8-III (Apr. 9, 2019). Judge Korsmo dissented.
Law Enforcement Digest Online Training
The Washington State Criminal Justice Training Commission now offers online training instead of the previous written digests. The online training sessions are of high quality and are applicable to prosecuting attorneys. The January 2019 Law Enforcement Digest is now available.
Articles of Interest
Locked Phones, Computers, or Files. How to resolve a defendant’s assertion of his Fifth Amendment rights when law enforcement seeks to compel the defendant to provide a password for a locked device collected pursuant to a search warrant. Orin S. Kerr, Compelled Decryption and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 97 Texas L. R. 768 (2019)
WEEKLY ROUNDUP FOR APRIL 5, 2019
Washington Supreme Court
Aggravated First Degree Murder Sentences and “Juveniles.” A judge has discretion to restructure a defendant’s entire sentence when setting a new minimum term pursuant to RCW 10.95.035 for a defendant who was convicted of additional crimes.. Regardless of any limitations contained in the relevant statutes, the trial court may find an exceptional sentence is warranted and it may adjust the standard sentence to provide for a reduced term or years, for concurrent rather than consecutive sentences, or for both. State v. Gilbert, No. 95814-9 (Apr. 4, 2019).
This week the Court granted review in the following matters:
DUI “Prior Offenses.” State v. Wu, No. 96747-4. King County. Questions presented: Whether a prior conviction meets the definition in RCW 46.61.5055(14)(a)(xii) is a question for the jury or a threshold question for the court in a felony DUI prosecution? COA opinion reported at 6 Wn. App. 2d 679 (2018). Petition for review pleadings available here.
Double Jeopardy and Standard of Review for Constitutional Claims. State v. Arndt, No. 95396-1. Kitsap County. Questions presented: Does the double jeopardy clause apply to aggravating circumstances? Does double jeopardy prohibit conviction for both aggravated first degree murder and arson, where the aggravating circumstance and the arson conviction are based on the same evidence? Did the trial court violate the defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense by excluding some of her expert’s testimony and must this error be reviewed de novo? COA opinion is unpublished. Petition for review pleadings available here.
Unlawful Practice of Law. State v. Yishmael, No. 96775-0. King County. Questions presented: Is unlawful practice of law a strict liability crime. Is the term “practice of law” unconstitutionally vague? Is it improper to use a court rule as the basis of a jury instruction defining the practice of law? COA opinion reported at 6 Wn. App. 2d 203 (2018). Petition for review pleadings available here.
Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws. State v. Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n, No. 96604-4. Questions presented: Whether the Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n, is a “political committee” under the Fair Campaign Practices Act (“FCPA”). Whether enforcement of the FCPA violated the First Amendment in this case. Whether the penalty imposed for the violations of the FCPA should be trebled. COA opinion reported at 5 Wn. App. 2d 542 (2018). Petition for review pleadings available here.
Taxation. First Student, Inc. v. State of Wash. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 96694-0. County. Questions presented: Whether assessment of business and occupation taxes upon a company that provides transportation services for compensation to organizations including school districts, youth groups, summer camps, and churches is proper. COA opinion reported at 4 Wn. App. 2d 857 (2018). Petition for review pleadings available here.
Access Device. An access device need not be able to obtain something of value at the time it is found on a defendant. The access device need only be able to obtain something of value at the time it was last in the possession of its lawful owner. The jury instruction defining “can be used” which was based on State v. Schloredt, 97 Wn. App. 789 (1999), was not an improper comment on the evidence. State v. Sandoval, COA No. 50814-1-II (Apr. 2, 2019).
Water Rules. The Department of Ecology has the authority to promulgate administrative rules that establish minimum instream flows for a river, require mitigation and metering for all new water appropriations, including permit exempt wells, and closes the basin to new surface water withdrawals for part of the year. DOE was not required to consider the “cost” of lost legal rights for potential drillers of future permit exempt wells in its least-burdensome alternatives and cost-benefit analyses. Bassett v. Department of Ecology, COA No. 51221-1-II (Apr. 2, 2019).
SEPA. The City of Puyallup is an “agency with jurisdiction” that can assume lead agency status under WAC 197-11-948 over a development that is outside the City’s limits but within the City’s Growth Management Urban Growth Area, as the City has approval and permitting authority over roadwork and sewer and water services that are part of the proposal. The City may assume lead agency status following the County’s issuance of a mitigated determination of nonsignificance. City of Puyallup v. Pierce County, COA No. 51501-6-II (Apr. 3, 2019).
Community Custody Conditions. A claim that conditions of community custody are not related to the circumstances of the crime will not be considered for the first time on appeal where the defendant informed the sentencing judge that he had no objection to the conditions. The phrase “dangerous weapon” is not unconstitutionally vague when it appears with an illustrative list: “dangerous weapons such as hunting knives or a bow and arrow.” The phrase “paraphernalia for the use of controlled substances” is not unconstitutionally vague. “Romantic” in the phrase “of any romantic or sexual relationship” is problematic; the better choice is “of any dating relationship or sexual relationship.” A condition that required the defendant to obtain approval from his corrections officer before engaging in volunteer, church, and travel activities must be modified to provide the corrections department with ascertainable standards to guide its enforcement of the provision. State v. Casimiro, COA No. 35680-9-III (Apr. 2, 2019).
Legal Update for Washington State Law Enforcement
The March 2019 edition of the Legal Update for Washington State Law Enforcement, which is authored by John Wasberg and which is hosted on the Washington Association of Sheriffs and Police Chief’s web site is now available.
Eighth Amendment and the Homeless. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment precluded the enforcement of a statute prohibiting sleeping outside against homeless individuals with no access to alternative shelter. As long as there is no option of sleeping indoors, the government cannot criminalize indigent, homeless people for sleeping outdoors, on public property, on the false premise they had a choice in the matter. Martin v. City of Boise, No. 15-35845 (9th Cir. Apr. 1, 2019) (amended opinion).
WEEKLY ROUNDUP FOR APRIL 19, 2019
Washington Supreme Court
Obstruction Conviction. RALJ court’s ruling upholding the obstruction conviction affirmed by an equally divided court. Justice Madsen recused herself and no pro tem justice replaced her. See State v. Beck, 56 Wn.2d 474 (1960) (when one justice has recused herself from participating in the decision and the remaining eight justices are equally divided in their decision, the judgment of the trial court stands).
Justices González, Fairhurst, Johnson and Gordon McCloud would hold that a person cannot be convicted of obstructing for refusing to open the door to officers who have a lawful right to make a warrantless entry pursuant to the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement. These four justices do not agree that a person has a duty to comply with the police’s demand to open the door under these circumstances, and that conduct that amounts to passive delay will not sustain an obstruction charge.
Justices Stephens, would hold that a person’s refusal to obey lawful commands to take a specific action is conduct sufficient to support an obstruction conviction, and that the officers’ orders to open the door were lawful under the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement. No constitutional or free speech rights allowed the defendant to refuse the polices’ demand to open the door under the facts of this case. City of Shoreline v. McLemore, No. 95707-0 (Apr. 18, 2019).
Waiver of Counsel. A trial court does not abuse its discretion by denying a competent defendant’s request to represent himself, where the defendant’s responses during the waiver of counsel colloquy indicates a lack of understanding of the consequences. In this case, the defendant indicated that the criminal charges did not pertain to him as he did not enter into a contract with the State and he was not a corporation. State v. Burns, No. 95528-0 (Apr. 18, 2019).
Confrontation Clause Violation. A defendant must raise an objection at trial or waive the right of confrontation. “[R]equiring an objection is in the interests of judicial efficiency and clarity, and provides a basis for appellate courts to review a trial judge’s decision. Where a defendant does not object at trial, ‘nothing the trial court does or fails to do is a denial of the right, and if there is no denial of a right, there is no error by the trial court, manifest or otherwise, that an appellate court can review.’” State v. Kronich, 160 Wn.2d 893 (2007), is abrogated to the extent its analysis is inconsistent with the waiver approach. State v. Burns, No. 95528-0 (Apr. 18, 2019). Justices Stephens, Madsen, Gordon McCloud and Wiggins concur with the result but disagree with the waiver rule.
Legal Financial Obligations. Social Security Act’s antiattachment statute, 42 U.S.C. § 407(a), does not prohibit the imposition of the mandatory crime victim fund assessment. The sentencing court, however, may not impose a payment schedule while the defendant’s only source of income is social security disability. The county clerk may require the defendant to provide proof that his only assets and income are derived from social security disability benefits. State v. Catling, No. 95794-1 (Apr. 18, 2019). Justice González authored the dissenting opinion which was joined by Justice Yu and Gordon McCloud.
Exclusionary Rule. The proper remedy following suppression of evidence by an appellate court is to vacate the convictions that depended upon the illegally collected evidence and to remand to the trial court for further proceedings. State v. McKee, No. 96035-6 (Apr. 18, 2019).
Immigration Enforcement. United States is not entitled to a preliminary injunction suspending a California statute that limits the cooperation between state and local law enforcement and federal immigration authorities. The statute which prohibits California law enforcement agencies from (1) “‘[t]ransfer[ring] an individual to immigration authorities unless authorized by a judicial warrant or judicial probable cause determination,” (2) “[p]roviding information regarding a person’s release date or responding to requests for notification by providing release dates or other information unless that information is available to the public,” and (3) “[p]roviding personal information . . . about an individual, including, but not limited to, the individual’s home address or work address unless that information is available to the public,” is consistent with California’s prerogatives under the Tenth Amendment and the anti-commandeering rule. United States v. State of California, No. 18-16496 (9th Cir. 2019).